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I. Although the word damages is frequently used in connection with adjectives, such as nominal
damages,punitive damages, or compensatory damages, for the purpose of this Article, unless used
with such a qualifying adjective, the word damages relates to compensatory damages.
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proximately caused by the tortious conduct of another, whether or
not such detriment could have been anticipated. 2 Detriment is
broadly defined as "a loss or harm suffered in person or
property."3 The ultimate goal underlying an award of
compensatory damages is to place the injured party, as nearly as
possible through an award of money, in the position the party
would have occupied had the injury never occurred. 4
Two conflicting principles are implemented in awarding
compensatory damages. On one hand, a plaintiff should be
compensated for all losses actually suffered or reasonably certain to
result in the future.5  On the other hand, a plaintiff should be
compensated only once for each element of loss and duplication of
damages is to be avoided. 6 The task of reconciling these principles
and arriving at a fair and reasonable award of damages is left to the
good judgment of the fact finder.7
In arriving at a fair and reasonable award of damages, the fact
finder is typically called upon to consider specific elements of
damage. In North Dakota, these elements have been incorporated
into the standard jury instruction for personal injury actions. 8
2. N.D. CENT. CODE §5 32-03-01, -20(1976). Section 32-03-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides as follows: "Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of
another may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called
damages." Id. 5 32-03-01. Section 32-03-20 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as follows:
"For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except when
otherwise expressly provided by law, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not." Id. S 32-03-20.
3. Id. S 32-03-02.
4. See Johnson v. Monsanto Co., 303 N.W.2d 86, 94 (N.D. 1981). See generally J. STEIN,
DAMAGES AND RECOVERY S 3 (1972) (declared object of money damages in claim for breach of
contract or for tort is to put plaintiff in same position, as he would have been if the contract had been
performed or the tort not committed).
5. See Johnson, 303 N.W.2d at 93-94.
6. See Shoemaker v. Sonju, 15 N.D. 518, 523, 108 N.W. 42, 44 (1906), quoted with approval in
Bumann v. Maurer, 203 N.W.2d 434, 439 (N.D. 1972); see also Johnson, 303 N.W.2d at 92 (injured
party limited to recovery of loss actually suffered and may not be placed in better position than
injured party would have occupied absent the injury).
7. See Kuntz v. Stelmachuk, 136 N.W.2d 810, 820 (N.D. 1965) (noting that the determination
of damages in a personal injury case is not susceptible of exact calculation and therefore fixing
damages, to a large degree, depends on the common knowledge, good sense, and practical judgment
of the jury).
8. See N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986). North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 1220
provides'.
In arriving at the amount of your verdict for damages arising from personal
injury, you may consider each of the following items of claimed detriment proximately
resulting from the injury in question:
A. Medical Expense
I. The reasonable value, not exceeding the actual cost to the Plaintiff, of
examinations, attention and care by doctors, services of nurses, attendants and
others, transportation, hospital accommodations, x-ray pictures, medicine,
therapeutic devices and other supplies, if any, reasonably required and actually
provided in treating the Plaintiff; and
2. The reasonable value of medical, surgical, hospital, and other services, care,
and supplies that will be required in the future treatment of the Plaintiff.
[VOL. 63:561562
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North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions- Civil 1220 lists the
following elements of damages: (1) past and future medical
expense; (2) past and future loss of productive time; (3) past and
future pain, discomfort, and mental anguish; and (4) permanent
disability. 9 These elements of damage are similar to those
recognized in other jurisdictions.10
B. Loss of Productive Time
The reasonable value of the productive time, if any, necessarily lost by the Plaintiff
since the injury and of any productive time that you find the Plaintiff will lose in
the future because of the impairment of his occupational ability. In this regard,
you may consider any loss of his earnings, any impairment of his earning capacity,
the manner in which he ordinarily occupied his time before the injury, his state of
health and physical ability, the nature and and extent of his injury, whether or not
it is permanent or, if not permanent, the extent of its duration, and all other factors
bearing upon his earning capacity.
C. Pain, Discomfort, and Mental Anguish
Reasonable compensation for pain, discomfort, and mental anguish suffered by
the Plaintiff, and for such pain, discomfort, and mental anguish, if any, as you find
he will suffer in the future.
D. Permanent Disability
Reasonable compensation for permanent injuries or lasting impairment of health,
that is, for the loss resulting from complete or partial disability in health, mind, or
person. In determining whether there are permanent injuries or lasting
impairment of health, you should consider the nature of the injuries or impairment
of health, whether the ailment can be cured or relieved by proper medical
treatment or care,:and whether the ailment will subside or become worse. The
measure of damages for permanent injuries or lasting impairment of health is
compensation for the disabling effect of the injury, past or prospective. The
destruction or impairment of any physical function is a proper element of damages.
Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-03.2-04 (Supp. 1987). Section 22-03.2-04 of the North Dakota
Century Code became effective July 8, 1987, after this Article was substantially completed, and it
provides as follows:
In any civil action for damages for wrongful death or injury to a person and
whether arising out of breach of contract or tort, damages may be awarded by the trier
of fact as follows:
1. Compensation for economic damages, which are damages arising from medical
expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, loss of earnings
and earning capacity, loss of income or support, burial costs, cost of substitute
domestic services, loss of employment or business or employment opportunities
and other monetary losses.
2. Compensation for noneconomic damages, which are damages arising from pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish,
emotional distress, fear of injury, loss or illness, loss of society and companionship,
loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation and other nonpecuniary
damage.
Id. Like N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220, S 32-03.2-04 itemizes certain elements or items of damages, without
specifically including loss of enjoyment of life. See N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE S
32-03.2-04 (Supp. 1987). Although 5 32-03.2-04 breaks damages into two main categories, economic
and noneconomic damages, it is fairly consistent with the categories of damages set forth in
NDJI-Civil 1220. See N.D.J.'I. -Civ. 1220 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-03.2-04 (Supp. 1987).
9. N.D.J.I. Civ. 1220 (1986).
10. See 3 L. FRUMER, PERSONAL INJURY S 3.04111 (1965). Section 3.04111 indicates that the
elements of compensator'y damages for personal injuries are:
(1) pain incident to physical injury, commonly called physical pain, (2) various
forms of mental suffering and anguish, (3) actual loss of time or earnings and
impairment of earning capacity, (4) reasonable cost of necessary medical treatment,
hospital care, nursing services, and related expenses, (5) physical disability or what is
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Recently, plaintiffs' attorneys have included as an element of
damages in their complaints in personal injury actions a claim for
the plaintiff's alleged loss of enjoyment of life flowing from his or
her injuries.1" Thus, courts have been and will be faced with the
questions of whether loss of enjoyment of life can be considered by
the jury and whether loss of enjoyment of life should be included as
a separate element of damages in the jury instructions and the
special verdict form. In essence, it boils down to the issue of
duplication of damages versus full compensation for the plaintiff's'
injuries.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
question whether loss of enjoyment of life can be considered by the
jury and if so, whether loss of enjoyment of life constitutes a
separate element of damages which a plaintiff is entitled to recover
in an action for personal injuries. These issues, however, have been
considered in jurisdictions outside of North Dakota, and courts
have employed a variety of approaches in resolving these issues and
have reached conflicting results. The purpose of this Article is to
analyze the case law from other jurisdictions and to provide some
suggestions for the resolution of these issues in the context of North
Dakota law.
II. CASE LAW FROM JURISDICTIONS OUTSIDE OF
NORTH DAKOTA
There is a large number ofjurisdictions which have considered
issues related in some fashion to loss of enjoyment of life. As a
general rule, courts have not specifically defined that phrase. A
review of the case law demonstrates that courts have viewed loss of
enjoyment of life in various ways. Some courts have viewed it as a
component of pain and suffering or mental anguish. 2 Given the
popularly referred to as the incapacity to lead a normal life; and (6) other expenses
incurred because of the injuries.
Id. (quoted with approval in Parris v.Johnson, 3 Wash. App. 853,-n.2, 479 P.2d 91,95 n.2 (1970)).
11. Courts have used a variety of phrases to describe what this Article refers to as loss of
enjoyment of life, such as physical inconvenience, deprivation of the pleasures of lift, loss of
enjoyment of the natural and ordinary uses of a healthy mind and body, and impairment of the
normal pursuits and pleasures of life. See, e..g., Arizona E.R.R. v. Bryan, 18 Ariz. 106, -_ , 157 P.
376, 381 (1916) (plaintiff to be compensated for all suffering of mind and body inflicted by the injury
and for personal inconvenience and the loss of time and expense of care), aff'd without op., 242 U.S.
621 (1917); Rice v. City ofCouncil Bluffs, 124 Iowa 639, -, 100 N.W. 506, 507 (1904)(plaintiffito
be compensated for the pain and inconvenience (fbody and anguish of mind suffered on account of
her injury). The phrase "loss of enjoyment of life" and similar expressions appear to be of more
recent origin. But see Hogan v. Sante Fe Trial Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720,-, 85 P.2d 28, 33
(1938)(plaintiff sought damages for loss of enjoyment caused by the injury). For the purpose of this
Article, unless otherwise indicated, "loss ofenjoyment oflife" includes all such similar phrases.
12. For a discussion of cases rejecting loss ofenJoyment of life as an element separate from pain
and suffering, see infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
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fact that phrase refers to "enjoyment," this is not surprising. The
use of the word "enjoyment" suggests consideration of the
plaintiff's state of mind or being. 13 Many courts, especially in
earlier cases, have focused instead on the inconvenience to the
plaintiff or on the plaintiff's loss of vitality, power, or physical
capacities. 14 In essence, these cases equate loss of enjoyment of life
with physical disability or permanent injury. 5 It appears that only
one court has attempted to distinguish loss of enjoyment of life from
both pain, suffering, or mental anguish and physical disability or
permanent injury. 
16
Case law from jurisdictions in which courts have considered
issues related to loss of enjoyment of life generally falls into four
categories: (1) cases that have totally rejected loss of enjoyment of
life as a consideration in awarding damages; (2) cases that hold loss
of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of damages; (3) cases
that recognize loss of enjoyment of life can be considered by the
jury, but do not address the issue of whether it can be considered as
a separate element of damages; and (4) cases that recognize loss of
enjoyment of life can be considered as a separate element of
damages under particular circumstances.
A. CASES REJECTING Loss OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE AS A
CONSIDERATION IN AWARDING DAMAGES
Typically, the cases that have rejected loss of enjoyment of life
as a consideration in awarding damages are older cases. The
13. Enjoyment is defined as "the action or state of enjoying." WEBSTER'S NF.w COL.LEGIATE
DICTIONARY 375 (1980). Enjoy is defined as "to take pleasure orsatisfaction in." Id.
14. For a discussion of cases in which courts have considered loss of enjoyment of lifle as
compensation for inconvenience or loss of physical capacity, set, infra notes 77-139 and
accompanying text.
15. Seegenerally 3 L. FRUMER, PERSONAL INJURY S3.04[l] (1965) (noting that the elements of
compensatory damages for personal injuries includes "physical disability or what is popularly
referred to as the incapacity to lead a normal life").
16. See Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824-25 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). In Thompson, the court stated:
Permanent impairment compensates the victim for the fact of being permanently
injured whether or not it causes any pain or inconveniene, pain and suff'ering
compensates the victim for the physical and mental discomfort caused by the injury,
and loss of enjoyment of life compensates the victim for the limitations on the person's
life created by the injury.
Id. at 824. The court's attempt to distinguish loss of enjoyment of life and permanent impairment is
questionable, and would not be consistent with North Dakota law. For an analysis of the court's
rationale in Thompson, and a comparison of that rationale to North Dakota law, see infra notes 196-
208 and accompanying text. Cf. Swiler v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 203 Neb. 183, 186, 277
N.W.2d-697, 700 (1979). The court in Swiler held that a duplication had not resulted in that case
even though the jury was apparently instructed to award damages for pain and suffering, permanent
disability, and loss of enjoyment of life. Id. However, the court did not define what was meant by loss
of enjoyment of life nor did the court attempt to distinguish loss of enjoyment of life from the other
elements of damages. See id.
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rationale underlying these cases is that damages for loss of
enjoyment of life would be too vague or speculative. 17 In Hogan v.
Sante Fe Trial 18 the plaintiff was an accomplished violinist who
suffered personal injuries to her left hand when the defendant
negligently drove his truck into the plaintiff's automobile.' 9 The
jury awarded the plaintiff $4000 for loss of enjoyment of life from
being unable to play the violin. 20 The Kansas Supreme Court
reversed the jury verdict after it determined that a violinist's loss of
enjoyment caused by personal injuries which made violin playing
impossible was too speculative and difficult to measure to form a
sound basis for the assessment of damages.21
A similar rationale was applied by the Supreme Court of
Indiana in City of Columbus v. Strassner.22 In Strassner the plaintiff
17. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, -, 25 N.E. 65, 67 (i890)(ioss of
personal enjoyment is an unanswerable question which presents an insuperable difficulty to the
measurement of damages); Hogan v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 725, 85 P.2d 28,
33-34 (1938)(loss of enjoyment from being unable to play the violin is too speculative and conjectural
for assessment of damages); Locke v. International & Great N.R.R., 25 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 147, 60
S.W. 314, 316 (1901)(loss of capacity for the enjoyment of pleasures of life is too vague to furnish any
basis for damages); see also Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life As a Distinct Element or Factor in
Awarding Damages For Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4th 293 (1984)(discussing case law pertaining to the
issue whether loss of enjoyment of life is a separate element of, or merely a factor in, awarding
compensatory damages in personal injury actions).
18. 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938).
19. Hogan v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720,_,85 P.2d 28, 31 (1938). The
plaintiff incurred a broken bone in her left hand as a result of the accident, which caused a permanent
stiffening of the little finger. Id.
20. Id. at __,85 P.2d at 30-31. The plaintiff had studied under artists worldwide, and had
played solos in public and had given individual violin lessons. Id. at __ , 85 P.2d at 31.
21. Id. at __ , 85 P.2d 28, 33-34. In Hogan the court noted that a separate award had been
made for pain and suffering resulting from the injury and that thejury had allowed nothing for loss of'
earnings. Id. at -, 85 P.2d at 33. The court, relying on its determination that such damages
would be too speculative, specifically rejected the plaintiff's argument that the .jury could have
allowed damages for permanent injury and the plaintiffs loss of enjoyment from being unable to play
the violin could have been included as an element therein. Id. at __, 85 P.2d at 34.
The court noted that there were several cases which, under varying circumstances, had held that
loss of enjoyment could constitute a proper element of damages, but declined to fillow such eases
without specifically distinguishing them. Id. at __, 85 P.2d at 33; see Budek v. City of Chicago,
279 Il. App. 410, 429 (1935)(loss of enjoyment out of life properly admitted as an element of
damages); Haynes v. Waterville & Oakland St. Ry., 101 Me. 335, -, 64 A. 614, 615
(1906)(same); Kasiski v. Central Power & Light Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 130,-, 132 A. 201, 202
(1926)(same); Haeusslerv. Consolidated Stone&Sand Co., 3 N.J. Misc. 159,-, 127 A. 602, 604
(1925)(same); Haucke v. Beckman, 96 NJ.L. 409,-, 115 A. 653, 653-54 (1921)(same);
Galveston Elec. Co. v. Biggs, 14 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)(same); Reed v..Jamieson
Inv. Co., 168 Wash. Il, I, 10 P.2d 977, 978-79 (1932)(same); Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores,
109 W.Va. 329,-, 154 S.E. 769, 774 (1930)(same); Kramer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R.,
226 Wis. 118,-, 276 N.W. 113, 120 (1937)(same); Bassett v. Milwaukee N.Ry., 169 Wis.
152,-, 170 N.W. 944, 946-47 (1919)(same); Benson v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Wis. 20,-., 132
N.W. 633, 637 (191 1)(same). In Hogan, the court relied upon the general principle "that recovery of'
damages may not be had where the cause of the injury is too remote and speculative and where the
alleged resulting damages are too conjectural and speculative to form a sound basis of measurement."
Hogan, 148 Kan. at __ , 85 P.2d at 32 (emphasis in original). However, pursuant to the'facts
presented in Hogan, there was no question regarding the cause of the injury and a well-reasoned
dissent argued that loss of enjoyment would be no more difficult to measure than physical pain,
mental suffering or anguish, or embarassment or humiliation as a result of disfigurement. Id. at
-, 85 P.2d at 34 (Wedell, J., dissenting).
22. 124 Ind. 482, 25 N.E. 65(1890).
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sustained personal injuries as a result of falling on the defendant's
sidewalk and she asserted that the defendant was negligent in
failing to have repaired the sidewalk.2 3 The trial judge instructed
the jury that if it found for the plaintiff it should take into
consideration in measuring damages any lack of personal
enjoyment caused by the injury.2 4 The supreme court determined
that there was no substantial basis for measurement of damages for
loss of personal enjoyment. 25 The court concluded that it was
erroneous to instruct that, in measuring damages, the jury should
consider any lack of personal enjoyment and therefore the court
reversed the trial court's decision. 
26
In Locke v. International & Great Northern Railroad Co. 27 the
plaintiff was injured while attempting to cross with his wagon and
team of mules over the defendant's railroad tracks at a road
crossing which was partially blocked by the defendant's railroad
workers and equipment. 28 The trial judge excluded testimony by
the plaintiff regarding loss of capacity for "the enjoyment of the
pleasures of life." ' 29  The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
determined that there was no error in excluding the testimony by
23. City of Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, -, 25 N.E. 65, 65 (1890). The defendant
alleged that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to look where she was walking. Id. at
-,25 N.E. at 65-66. The trial judge determined that the question of contributory negligence was
a question of fact for the jury, and the jury concluded that the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent. Id. at , 25 N.E. at 66.
24. Id. at-., 25 N.E. at 67.
25. Id. The court stated that measuring loss of personal enjoyment on a monetary basis was an
"insuperable" difficulty. Id.
26. Id. Courts in Indiana have reached mixed results subsequent to the decision in Strassner. An
instruction which allowed the jury to consider the fact that the plaintiff was deprived of pleasure and
satisfaction in life as a result of his iniuries was approved in two cases subsequent to the decision in
Strassner. See American Strawboard Co. v. Foust, 12 Ind. App. 421,-, 39 N.E. 891, 894 (1895);
Pittsburgh, C.,C. & St. L. Ry., 39 Ind. App. 682,-, 79 N.E. 534, 539 (1906). However, these
cases were expressly overruled in South Bend Brick Co. v. Goller. South Bend Brick Co. v. Goller,
46 Ind. App. 531,-, 93 N.E. 37, 40(1910). In Goller, the Appellate Court of Indiana held that the
trial court had erred in instructing the jury it could consider as an element of damages the plaintiff's
"inability to enjoy life," because such damages would be speculative. Id at __, 93 N.E. at 39-40.
More recent Indiana cases have noted that the jury can consider loss ofenjoyment of life in awarding
damages. See Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Liddell, 126 Ind. App. 113,-, 126 N.E. 2d 18,
20 (1955), transfer denied, 234 Ind. 652, 130 N.E.2d 459 (1955) (noting that in determining the
amount of damages the factfinder can consider the "disability to perform the ordinary pursuits of
lile" resulting from the injury, as well as the bodily and mental suffering which will result); Samuel
E. Pentecost Constr. Co. v. O'Donnell, 112 Ind. App. 47, -, 39 N.E. 2d 812, 819 (1942)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that the damages awarded were excessive and notine that the
'jury was entitled to consider the plaintiff's personal suffering and "the fact that he hald] been depriv-
ed of enjoyments common to men of his class"); Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Stierwalt, 87 Ind. App. 478,
-, 153 N.E. 807, 813 (1926), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 633, 633-34 (1928) (holding that a $42,000
verdict lr a railroad brakeman who lost both legs was not excessive because in addition to
considering his loss ofearnings, the jury was entitled to consider his personal suffering and "the fact
that he had been deprived of most of the privileges and *enjoyments common to men of his class").
27.25 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 60 S.W. 314(1901).
28. Locke v. International & Great N. R.R., 25 Tex. Civ. App. 145, __, 60 S.W. 314, 314-15
(1901). The plaintiff's mules were spooked while crossing the tracks, and plaintiff was thrown from
the wagon and dragged approximately 50 yards. Id.
29. Id. at-_, 60 S.W. at 316.
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the plaintiff because the matter was too vague to provide
information on a subject for which damages could be allowed.
30
The rationale in cases such as Hogan, Strassner, and Locke,
which have rejected loss of enjoyment of life as a consideration in
awarding damages, is conclusory at best. Recently courts have
rejected this rationale3 l and concluded that evidence of loss of
enjoyment of life is no more vague or speculative than that for other
items of general damages such as pain and suffering or mental
anguish.3 2 This conclusion is sound. Thus, in most modern cases,
regardless of whether loss of enjoyment of life is considered a
separate element of damages or a component of some other element
of damages, evidence of such alleged losses may be introduced and
argued to the jury as part of the plaintiff's case.
33
B. CASES HOLDING Loss OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE IS NOT A
SEPARATE ELEMENT OF DAMAGES.
While some courts have determined that loss of enjoyment of
life is an improper consideration in awarding damages, 34 a number
of cases have merely reached the conclusion that loss of enjoyment
of life is not a separate element of damages in an action for personal
30. Id. More recent Texas cases have considered the plaintiff's inability to lead a normal life in
determining on appeal whether the damages awarded at trial were excessive. See Missouri Pac. R.R.
v. Handley, 341 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (damages award for mental anguish,
severe and continued pain and suffering, disfigurement, embarassment and inability to live a normal
life deemed not excessive); Galveston Elec. Co. v. Biggs, 14 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)
(testimony by plaintiff that she could no longer do many things she had been accustomed to doing
before her injury supported jury award).
31. See, e.g., Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12-13 n.3 (Wyo. 1980) (describing the rationale
in cases claiming that damages for loss of enjoyment of life are too speculative as "obsolete").
32. See, e.g., Power v. City of Augusta, 191 F. 647, 650 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911) (recognizing the
broader view by other appellate courts in allowing compensation for impairment of ability to move
about as one would like); Locicero v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 399 So.2d 712, 714 (La. App. 1981)
(deprivation of opportunity to compete for a college position and effect on life style not too
speculative in assessing damages); see also Hogan v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, -,
85 P. 2d 28, 34 (1938) (Wedell, J., dissenting). In Hogan, Justice Wedell expressed his opinion that
any injury which deprives a human being of an existing privilege or of a definite existing enjoyment
of life robs the individual of an important right and the loss of that right is compensable. Id. He
discussed at length cases which recognized damage awards for "diminished capacity for enjoying
life" and "mental suffering induced by mortification and disfigurement," and asserted that there is
no substantial difference between these phrases and loss of enjoyment of life. Id. at 35-36. Justice
Wedell further asserted that the distinctions that the majority attempted to make between loss of
enjoyment of life and other elements of personal damages were themselves becoming too vague and
speculative to form a basis upon which to establish sound principles. Id. at 37-38.
33. See, e.g., Huff v. Tracy, 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (1976) (noting
that one component of general damages is physical impairment which limits the plaintiff's capacity to
share in the amenities of life and that there is no rule which restricts a plaintiff's attorney from
arguing this element to the jury). See generallyJ. STEIN, supra note 14, S 47, at 77-78 (stating that it is
reasonably certain that evidence of loss of enjoyment of life may be shown and argued to the jury as
part of the mental anguish endured as a result of the injury).
34. For a discussion of cases which have determined that loss of enjoyment of life is an improper
consideration in awarding damages, see supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
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injuries.35 Some courts have held that the trial court errs if it gives a
separate instruction on loss of enjoyment of life or if it permits the
jury to make a separate award of damages for loss of enjoyment of
life.3 6 The typical rationale in these cases is that an award of
damages for loss of enjoyment of life would result in an
impermissible duplication of the damages awarded for other
elements. s 7 Other courts have concluded that the trial court does
not err in failing to give a separate instruction on loss of enjoyment
of life because the plaintiff's alleged loss of enjoyment of life is
encompassed within one of the established elements of damage,
such as pain and suffering.
38
Perhaps the leading case among those which have rejected loss
of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damage is Blodgett v.
Olympic Savings & Loan Association. 39 In Blodgett the plaintiff was
injured as a result of the defendants' negligence.40 The instructions
35. See e.g., Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 944, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (determining that loss of
enjoyment oflife is not a separate element of damages).
36. See, e.g., id. (holding that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction which permitted an
award of damages for loss of enjoyment of life, in addition to those for pain and mental and
emotional distress); Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 393 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978)
(holding that the trial court committed reversible error in a survival action when it instructed thejury
it could separately consider and award damages for loss of life's pleasures); Blodgett v. Olympic Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash. App. 116, -_, 646 P.2d 139, 146 (1982) (holding that the trial court erred
in instructing the jury that loss of enjoyment of life was an element of damages which it could
consider).
37. See Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3rd at 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553; Blodgett, 32 Wash. App. at __,
646 P.2d at 145-46; cf. Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (noting that loss of
enjoyment of life is encompassed within future pain and suffering and that "[ijt would be plainly
duplicative to allow a separate award for loss of enjoyment of life").
38. See Dugas v. Kansas City S. Ry. Lines, 473 F.2d 821, 827 (5th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 475
F.2d 1404 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973) (noting that damages for loss of the normal
pursuits and pleasures are to be included as a part of pain, suffering, and inconvenience and not
separately measured as an independent ground for damages, and similarly, loss of vitality is included
in the consequences of physical injury and not to be separately measured); Funston v. United States,
513 F. Supp. 1000, 1010 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that the element of pain and suffering includes not
only compensation for physical pain and suffering, but also for humilitation, depression, and loss of
enjoyment of life); Aretz v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 397, 401,-02 (S.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 604 F.2d
417 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that under Georgia law pain and suffering is a generic name for several
types of damages, including mental and physical pain and suffering, disfigurement, impairment of
ability to work, and mental distress caused by impairment of the enjoyment of life); Wingfield v.
Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 688-89 (D.C. 1977) (holding that the trial court did not err
in refusing to give an enjoyment of life instruction, when the court instructed on recovery for pain,
discomfort, and mental anguish); Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (noting that
loss of enjoyment of life is a factor to be considered as a part of future pain and suffering, and is not a
separate element of damages); see also Degen v. Bayman, 241 N.W.2d 703, 707 (S.D. 1976) (finding
no error in the trial court's refusal to instruct on personal inconvenience and loss of ability to enjoy
life when the court fully instructed the jury on damages for pain, suffering and mental anguish, as
well as for disability and time lost from pursuing normal activities); .Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill
Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980) (including in mental pain and suffering the
diminished enjoyment of life, as well as the humiliation and embarassment resulting from permanent
scars and disability).
39. 32 Wash. App. 116,646 P.2d 139 (1982).
40. Blodgett v. Olympic Say. & Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash. App. 116, ,646 P.2d 139, 145-46
(1982). The plaintiff's injures occurred while she was walking on a public sidewalk next to a
construction site and a gust of wind blew over a 8 x 16 foot panel, which struck her on the head. Id. at
-, 646 P.2d at 141. Although the court did not specifically discuss the plaintiff's injuries, it
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given by the trial court were those set forth in Washington Pattern
Jury Instructions 30.01 and 30.04-30.08, to which was added an
additional item, "the loss or impairment of the capacity to enjoy
life. "41 The elements of damages included in Washington Pattern
Jury Instructions 30.04-.08, are as follows: (1) the nature and ex-
tent of the injury; (2) past and future disability and disfigurement;
(3) past and future mental and physical pain and suffering; (4) past
and future medical expenses; and (5) past and future loss of
earnings.4 2 The Court of Appeals of Washington stated that loss of
the ability to enjoy the pleasures of life is not a separate element of
damages, but a component of pain and suffering or disability.
43
The court apparently agreed with the defendants' contention that
the instructions given, which permitted the jury to award damages
for both loss or impairment of the capacity to enjoy life and physical
and mental disability, were duplicative. 4 The court concluded that
the trial court had erred in instructing the jury on damages and
reversed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$850,000.
45
In Wooldridge v. Woolett4 6 the plaintiff sought damages in a
survival action against the driver and owners of a car in which the
appears that the plaintiff's alleged injuries included brain damage, psychiatric disorders, and
physical disabilities. Id. at-__, n.2, 646 P.2d at 142 n.2.
41. Id. at -, 646 P.2d at 145; see W.P.I. 30.01, 30.04-08 (1980) (amended 1984).
Washington Pattern Jury Instruction 30.01 indicates that the jury should be instructed that "you
must determine the amount of money which will reasonably and fully compensate the plaintiff for
.such damages as you find were proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant," and that
"you should consider the following elements:.... ." W.P.I. 30.01 (1980) (amended 1984).
Washington PatternJury Instructions 30.01 further provides that this instruction should be followed
by a list of the appropriate elements contained in Washington Pattern Jury Instructions 30.04-.16.
Id.; see id. 30.04-.16 (1980) (amended 1984).
42. See W.P.I. 30.04-.08 (1980) (amended 1984).
43. Blodgett, 32 Wash. App. at -, 646 P.2d at 145-46 (citing Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96
Wash.2d 659, 665, 638 P.2d 566, 569 (1981)). The court (lid not specifically state whether it
considered loss of enjoyment of life to be a component of pain and suffering, of disability, or of both.
See id. It did note that disability included an impairment of the capacity to engage in leisure activities
as well as an impairment of work capacity. Id. at ., 646 P.2d at 145 (quoting Parris v..Johnson, 3
Wash. App. 853, 859-60, 479 P.2d 91, 95 (1970)). However, the court in Blodgett also noted that the
court in Parris, as well as the court in Wooldridge, considered loss of enjoyment of life to be a
component of pain and suffering. Blodgett, 32 Wash. App. at -, 646 P.2d at 145-46; see Parris, 3
Wash. App. 853, 859-60, 479 P.2d 91, 95; Wooldridge, 96 Wash. 2d at -, 638 P.2d at 569.
Following its discussion of Parris and Wooldridge, the court in Blodgett merely concluded that "it was
error" to include loss of enjoyment of life as an element of damages. Blodgett, 32 Wash. App. at-..,
646 P.2d at 146.
44. See id. While the court did not specifically state that the instructions were duplicative, its
discussion of prior cases and the defendants' argument makes it clear that this was the court's
conclusion. See id. at -, 646 P.2d at 145-46.
45. Blodgett, 32 Wash. App. at __ 646 P.2d at 145-46. The court found several other errors on
appeal and did not specifically articulate which errors were grounds for reversal. See id. However,
given the fact that there was a large award of damages and the court's reliance upon and quotation
of previous Washington cases, it appears that the court would have reversed and remanded for a new
trial solely because of the erroneous loss of enjoyment of life instruction. See id; see also Parris, 3 Wash.
App. at -, 479 P.2d at 95; Wooldridge, 96 Wash. 2d at __ , 638 P.2d at 569.
46.96 Wash. 2d 659, 638 P.2d 566 (1981).
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plaintiff's son was riding as a passenger when the car overturned
and he was killed.4 7 The trial jury awarded general damages but
rejected a claim for loss of life's amenities.48 The Supreme Court of
Washington discussed "enjoyment of life's pleasures" and "loss of
life's amenities" as elements of damages in a survival action. 49 The
court noted that damages for life's amenities essentially represented
pain and suffering. 50 Furthermore, the court quoted with approval
the court of appeals which stated that, insofar as damages for
shortened life expectancy imply damages for the loss of life's
pleasures and amenities, such damages are "but a component of
pain, suffering, anxiety, and distress." ' 51 The court in Wooldridge
also relied upon a prior Washington Court of Appeals opinion in a
personal injury case, in which the court had considered the loss of
enjoyment of life's pleasures as merely a component of pain and
suffering. 52 Thus, although Wooldridge was a survival action, it
appears that the same rationale would be applied by the Supreme
Court of Washington in a personal injury action.
In Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center,53 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on
the ground that the trial court committed reversible error when it
instructed the jury in a survival action it could separately consider
'and award damages for loss of life's pleasures.5 4 The trial court had
47. Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wash. 2d 659, -, 638 P.2d 566, 567 (1981). The plaintiff
brought the action as administrator of his decedent son's estate, who at the time of his death was 21
years of age. Id.
48. Id. at __; 638 P.2d at 568. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2339.51 for funeral and burial
expenses. Id.
49. Id. at __, 638 P.2d at 569-70.
50. Id. at -, 638 P.2d at 570. The court reasoned that loss of life's amenities should be
recoverable only by plaintiffs who survive compensable injuries, since those injuries are personal to
that individual and in essence represent pain and suffering. Id.
51. Id. at -_, 638 P.2d at 569 (1981) (quoting 28 Wash. App. 869, -. , 626 P.2d 1007, 1007
(1981)).
52. See Wooldridge, 96 Wash. 2d at -, 638 P.2d at 569, (citing Parris v. Johnson, 3 Wash.
App. 853, __ , 479 P.2d 91, 95 (1970)). In Parris, the court rejected the defendants' contentions
that medical evidence was necessary to support a claim of disability and that the damages awarded to
the plaintiffwere excessive, stating:
In considering the meaning of the term "disability" we frequently think in terms
of impairment of work capacity. That is probably the easiest form of disability to
translate into pecuniary loss. There are, however, other activities which are com-
pensable under the general tee'm of disability. "Man does not live by bread alone" nor
does his life consist solely of performing the tasks necessary to buy that bread. In the
24-hour day one-third may be devoted to work, one-third to sleep and one-third to
leisure. An impairment of any one of these aspects of life may constitute a disability.
Parris, 3 Wash. App. at __, 479 P.2d at 95.
53. 482 Pa. 411,393 A.2d 1188 (1978).
54. Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 482 Pa. 411, -, 393 A.2d 1188, 1190-91
(1978). The plaintiff was the father of a five-year old son who entered Mercy Catholic Medical
Center for a tonsillectomy. Id. at -, 393 A.2d at 1189. A nurse anesthetist negligently
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instructed the jury to award damages for "pain and suffering" and
for "any loss that may have been sustained as a result of the loss of
amenities or pleasures of life." 5 5 The supreme court noted it "has
never held that loss of life's pleasures may be compensated other
than as a component of pain and suffering."
56
Similarly, in Huff v. Tracy 51 the California Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction which
permitted an award of damages for loss of enjoyment of life, in
addition to those for pain and mental and emotional distress.58 The
court noted that California case law recognizes physical
impairment as one component of general damages.5 9 The court
reasoned that physical impairment limits the plaintiff's capacity to
share in the amenities of life and that there was no rule which
restricted the plaintiff's attorney from arguing this element to the
jury. 60 However, the court stated the real question was not the
propriety of awarding damages for such a loss, but whether a court
could instruct the jury on loss of enjoyment of life in addition to or
distinct from general damages.61 The California Court of Appeal
concluded that courts may not instruct a jury on both loss of
enjoyment of life and general damages, reasoning that such an
instruction would create the possibility of double compensation.
62
administered anesthesia to the boy, resulting in cardiac arrest and subsequently the boy's death..Id.
at__, 393 A.2d at 1189-90.
55. Id. at __, 393 A.2d at 1190.
56. Id. at __, 393 A.2d at 1191. But see Daugherty v. Eric R.R., 403 Pa. 334, __ , 169 A.2d
549, 552 (1961) (court took into consideration the plaintiffs loss of the senses of taste and smell and
described this loss as a "serious impairment" representing "a not inconsiderable portion of man's
enjoyment of life").
57. 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1976).
58. Huff v. Tracy, 57 Cal. App. 3d 193911-., 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 552-53 (1976); accordAkers
v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 655, 219 Cal. Rptr. 513, 526 (1985) (jury instruction which
combined the concepts of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life was erroneous, but there
was no prejudicial error). In Huff the trial court gave California's standard jury instruction on pain
and suffering, which instructs the jury to award "jr~easonable compensation for any pain,
discomfort, fears, anxiety and other mental and emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff anti of
which his injury was a proximate cause [and for similar suffering reasonably certain to be
experienced in the future from the same cause]." Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 942 n.1, 129 Cal. Rptr.
at 552 n. I (quoting in part B.A.J.I. 14.13 (1969) (current version at B.A.J.l. 14.13 (Supp. 1987)). In
addition, at the plaintiff's request, the jury was instructed on loss of enjoyment of life as follows:
"You may also award plaintiff reasonable compensation for the physical and mental effects of the
injury on his ability to engage in those activities which normally constitutes jsic] the enjoyment of
life." Id. at 942 n.2, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 552 n.2 (quoting the trial court's instruction).
59. Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (citing Henninger v. Southern Pac. Co.,
250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 883, 59 Cal. Rptr. 76, 84 (1967) (loss of both legs); Purdy v. Swift & Co., 34
Cal. App. 2d 656, 658, 94 P.2d 389, 390 (1939) (impairment of taste and smell); Scally v. W.T.




62. Id. The court in Huff noted that California's standard pain and suffering instruction
describes a unitary concept of recovery "not only for physical pain, but for fright, nervousness, grief,
anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarassment, apprehension, terror or
ordeal." Id. (quoting Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93, 1500 P.2d 880, 883,
103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1972)); see B.A.J.I. 14.13 (1969) (current version at B.A.J.I. 14.13
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The court stated: "A separate enjoyment of life instruction only
repeats what is effectively communicated by the pain and suffering
instruction." 63 Although the court in Huff held that the erroneous
loss of enjoyment of life instruction constituted harmless error,
64
the case clearly stands for the proposition that a separate instruction
for loss of enjoyment of life should not be given.
(Supp. 1987)). For the relevant text of California's standard jury instruction in 1976 regarding pain
and suffering, see supra note 58. Given the broad nature of the standard pain and suffering
instruction and the all-encompassing manner in which the instruction has been viewed and applied
by the courts in California, it is not surprising that the court in Huff determined that the plaintiff's
enjoyment of life instruction was repetitive. See Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
The decision in Huff has been criticized by one commentator who argues that "[o]nly by
recognizing the conceptual uniqueness of loss ofenioyment of life and its evolution as an independent
element of damages will an individual's interest in the enjoyment of life be adequately protected."
Note, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 PAC. L.J. 965, 985-86 (1981). This
commentator indicates that compensatory damages fall into three general categories: "(1) loss of
earning capacity; (2) out-of-pocket expenses; and (3) pain and suffering," and advocates the
addition of loss of enjoyment of life as a fourth category. Id. at 965-66. The commentator argues that
loss of enioyment of life should be distinct from pain and suffering because it "focuses on the
limitations placed on a person's ability to enjoy the amenities of life," or the "effect of the plaintiff's
impaired physical capacity upon his or her enjoyment of life." Id. at 978-79.
While there is some merit to the commentator's argument that California's pain and suffering
instruction is not as all encompassing as the courts have suggested, this does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the only way to assure adequate compensation for a plaintiff is by recognizing
loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages. An obvious alternative would be simply to
revise the pain and suffering instruction to include language which specifically allows the jury to
consider the inconvenience and disability resulting from the injury. This could be done while
retaining the unitary concept for general damages. Another alternative, and one which has been
adopted by many jurisdictions, is to recognize as a fourth category of compensatory damages the
plaintiff's permanent 'disability or injury. See Blodgett v. Olympic Say. & Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash.
App. 116, __, 646 P.2d 139, 145; see also N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986) (court instructions to jury
that permanent disability may be considered as an item of claimed detriment). For the text of North
Dakota PatternJury Instructions - Civil 1220, see supra note 8.
63. Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553. To the extent that loss of enjoyment of
life is said to focus on the plaintiff's physical limitations, the court's conclusion appears to be
strained, since California's Standard Jury Instructions 14.13 refers only to "pain, discomfort, fears,
anxiety and other mental and emotional distress." See B.A..I.. 14.13 (1969) (current version at
B.AJ.I. 1413 (Supp. 1987)). Many jurisdictions have recognized that the continuing disability
resulting from an injury is compensable even if it causes no pain and suffering or out-of-
pocket expenses. See, e.g., Power v. City of Augusta, 191 F.647, 650 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911)
(permanent bodily injury involves an alteration in one's person from what it was before and jury
should be allowed to decide whether to compensate for it). This is the result in North Dakota, which
recognizes permanent injury and disability as a separate element of damages. See N.D.J.I.-Civ.
1220 (1986). For the text of North DakotaJury Instructions - Civil 1220, see supra note 8. Clearly,
such a result is not expressly authorized in the California Standard Jury Instructions. See B.AJ.I.
14.13 (1969) (current version at B.A.J.I. 14.13 (Supp. 1987)). Moreover, given the language of
California's standard jury instructions on pain and suffering, it is questionable whether the jury is
effectively told they can award general damages under such circumstances. See id.
64. Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 944, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553. The court in Huff stated:
In this case the erroneous instruction was harmless error. The plaintiff was a 3 1-
year-old married man, the father of two young children. He could not work for ten
months and lost earnings from two sources aggregating almost $12,000. His medical
bills were almost $2,000. His tongue had been almost severed and his taste faculty
permanently impaired. He suffered a severe cerebral concussion which caused
headaches and dizziness. These symptoms were confirmed by encephalograms. His
head injury became asymptomatic after six months; nevertheless, his doctor
postulated the possibility of post-traumatic headaches and dizziness. He suffered a
compression fracture of a cervical vertebra which required a neck brace for some
months and left him with subjective complaints of neck tautness. His injuries included
multiple abrasions and contusions. He complained ofa leg injury and a slight limp.
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C. CASES MERELY RECOGNIZING Loss OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE
CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY.
In a number of cases, particularly cases in which the jury's
verdict has been attacked on appeal as excessive, courts have
indicated that the plaintiff's loss of enjoyment of life is something
the jury could have properly considered in arriving at its verdict. 65
For example, in Anunti v. Payette,66  the Supreme Court of
Minnesota upheld the jury's verdict of $346,000 for a plaintiff who
was seriously injured in an automobile accident. 67 On appeal, the
defendants argued the jury's verdict was excessive and that the
damages were awarded under the influence of passion and
prejudice. The court rejected this argument, noting the plaintiff
In view of these losses and injuries, the $80,000 award was well within the bounds
of reason. The record on appeal shows no claim of excessive damages in the trial court
and none is urged here. Nothing in the record shows that the jurors requested or were
given copies of the written instructions .... Thus the enjoyment-of-life instruction was
not before the jury as a physical manifestation separate from the pain-and-suffering
instruction. Rather, it was part of an oral flow of instructions, conveying the
impression of one item of loss within the general ambit of pain-and-suffering.
Whatever the erroneous instruction's potential for causing double compensation, the
present record discloses no reasonable probability that it increased the award. Con-
sequently, the error does not cause reversal.
Id. at 944, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54 (citations omitted).
65. See, e.g., Locicero v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 712, 714-15 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(in rejecting the contention that a $65,000 verdict for an injury to a 17 year old plaintiff's arm was
excessive, the court noted that the jury could consider the effect of the injury on the plaintiff's
lifestyle, including loss of social and recreational activities); Anunti v. Payette, 268 N.W.2d 52, 55
(Minn. 1978) (in rejecting the defendants' argument that the verdict was excessive, the court noted
that in addition to considering the medical expenses and loss of earnings, the jury had the right to
consider the plaintiff's past and future pain and suffering, his disfigurement, his permanent
disability, and the effect of his injuries on the enjoyment of the amenitites of life); Kasiski v. Central
Power & Light Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 130, -, 132 A. 201, 202 (1926) (in holding that the verdict was
not excessive, the court noted that the factors for consideration in awarding damages included pain
and anguish, the limited use of the plaintiff's hand, the impairment of his ability to enjoy the games
of childhood, limitations on his choice of vocation as a result of the injury, and his diminished
earning power); Riddle v. Memorial Hosp., 43 A.D.2d 750, -, 349 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1973) (noting that in ascertaining whether the verdict is excessive, consideration should be
given to the nature and extent of the injuries, the permanency of the injuries, the extent of pain, and
any lasting effects the injuries have, including impairment or loss of artistic pursuits); Gasque v.
Heublein, Inc., 281 S.C. 278, -, 315 S.E.2d 556, 561-62 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (in holding that a
general verdict of $750,000 to a plaintiff who suffered permanent loss of vision in one eye was not
excessive, the court noted that the jury was entitled to consider the permanency of the plaintiff's
injury, his pain and suffering, diminution of his earning capacity, his disfigurement, his
psychological trauma, alterations in his lifestyle, and his past and future medical expenses). See
generally Annotation, supra note 17, at 300 (discussing cases in which courts have held that loss of
enjoyment of life may be treated as a factor in determining the extent of the injuries and damages in
general or for pain and suffering).
66. 268 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1978). "
67. Anunti v. Payette, 268 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. 1978). There was evidence that the plaintiff
had suffered a brain stem injury, permanent hearing loss in both ears, and possibly a myocardial
infarction as a result of the accident. Id. at 54-55. In addition, he suffered from a balance problem,
developed a bizarre gait, and was rendered permanently incapable of any meaningful employment as
a result of the accident. Id.
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had medical expenses of $5300, he was totally and completely
disabled as a result of the accident, and the evidence supported an
award for past lost earnings of $58,650 and for future lost earnings,
reduced to present value, of $337,235.6 The court went on to state
that the jury had a right to consider the plaintiff's past and future
pain and suffering, his degree of disfigurement evidenced by his
strange gait, the permanent disability involved, and the effect of his
injuries on the enjoyment of the amenities of life.
69
The court's statement in Anunti makes it clear that evidence of
the plaintiff's loss of enjoyment of life can be submitted and
considered by a jury in awarding damages in Minnesota. 70 This is
no indication, however, that there can be a separate instruction on
loss of enjoyment of life or that loss of enjoyment of life can be
considered as a separate element of damages. The task of courts in
cases such as Anunti, in which the verdict is challenged as excessive
on appeal, is merely to determine whether the evidence is sufficient
to support the verdict. 71 Thus, in such cases, courts typically are
required to make a thorough review of the plaintiff's injuries and
the effects of such injuries. 72 In doing so, courts have commented
that juries can consider loss of enjoyment of life in awarding
damages. 73 These statements obviously provide some support for
the proposition that the plaintiff ought to be permitted to introduce
evidence of his loss of enjoyment of life and that it would not be
improper for counsel in his closing argument to ask the jury to
consider this loss. 74 Care must be taken, however, to avoid reading
68. Id at 55.
69. Id. (citing Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672 (Minn. 1977)).
Ossenfort, like Anunti, involved the issue of whether the damages awarded to the plaintiff were
excessive. Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 684-85 (Minn. 1977).
The court in Ossenfort stated:
The award as to Lloyd Ossenfort was clearly not excessive, given the settled
factors applicable to the assessment of personal injuries: Past and future pain and
suffering, permanent disability, life expectancy, loss of earning power, the effect on
plaintiff's enjoyment of the amenities of life, degree of disfigurement, and the
inflationary trend of the economy.
Id. at 685 (citation omitted).
70. SeeAnunti, 268 N.W.2d at 55.
71. See id.; see also Busch v. Busch Constr. Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 398 (Minn. 1977) (noting that
the determination of the amount of general damages is generally left to the discretion of the jury and
the trial court).
72. See, e.g., Anunti, 268 N.W.2d at 54-55.
73. See, e.g., id.
74. See, e.g., Locicero v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 712, 714-15 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(noting that the effects of the plaintiff's injuries on his lifestyle were not too speculative to be
considered in assessing damages). See generally Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of LifeAs An Element of, or
Factor in Determining Damages For Bodily Injury, 15 A.L.R.3d 506, 509-10 (1967); superseded by,
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cases such as Anunti for more than these limited propositions. 75
Such cases do not address the questions of whether there can be
separate award of damages for loss of enjoyment of life or whether
the jury should be instructed that loss of enjoyment of life is a factor
that can be considered in arriving at the amount of damages.
Therefore, these cases cannot properly be considered as providing
authority on these points.
76
D. CASES RECOGNIZING Loss OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE AS A
SEPARATE ELEMENT OF DAMAGES.
A number of courts have recognized loss of enjoyment of life as
a separate element of damages in a personal injury action under
varying circumstances. 77  These cases generally support the
proposition that under certain circumstances a trial court does not
err in giving a separate instruction on loss of enjoyment of life and
it is not improper for the fact finder to make a separate award for
such loss. 78 However, given the varied circumstances which have
existed in such cases, it is important to consider the facts in a
particular case and the rationale underlying the court's decision
before drawing any conclusions from such cases. Furthermore, it is
important to consider the historical development of the concept of
loss of enjoyment of life in order to view these cases in the proper
perspective.
A review of cases which have recognized, in some fashion, that
loss of enjoyment of life may be a separate compensable element of
damages 79 reveals that the concept of loss of enjoyment of life
originally developed as a way of compensating the plaintiff for the
continuing effects of an injury, even though the injury might not
cause continuing economic loss or even physical pain. For example,
Annotation, supra note 17 (noting that cases in which the sole issue was the excessiveness or the
inadequacy of the verdict would be tenuous authority for the proposition that loss of enjoyment may
be claimed as special damages, apart from general pain and suffering).
75. See Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781, 786 (N.D. 1985) (noting the authority of a decision
is limited to the points actually considered and determined).
76. See generally Annotation, supra note 74, at 513 (noting that while cases in which the sole issue
was the excessiveness of the verdict may provide authority for the introduction ofevidence for loss of
enjoyment and consideration of loss of enjoyment when the jury determines damages, the cases do
not necessarily indicate that a jury may be instructed to award separate or special damages for loss of
enjoyment).
77. See infra notes 80-135 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450, 459 (1890) (all evidence tending
to show the character of plaintiff's pursuits and the extent that the injury prevented him from
f'ollowing those pursuits is pertinent to the issue ofldamages).
79. A review of the cases cited to support the proposition that loss of enjoyment of life may be
considered as a separate element reveals that a variety of phrases have been used to describe the
concept of loss of enjoyment of life. For a list of phrases used to describe the concept of loss of
enjoyment of life, see supra note 11.
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in Power v. City of Augusta,80 the plaintiff was awarded $2500 as
compensation for a permanent and disabling knee injury resulting
from a fall in the City of Augusta."' The defendant appealed the
award on the grounds that the jury had improperly been permitted
to consider the plaintiff's permanent injury in addition to her pain
and suffering and medical expenses and therefore the damage
award was excessive.8 2 The defendant argued that recovery for
permanent injuries was limited to a reduction of the power to earn
money resulting from such injuries, and that the trial court
therefore erred in giving instructions which permitted
consideration of the effects of the plaintiff's injury because the
plaintiff had not sustained any loss of earnings.8 3 After a fairly
extensive review of relevant case law, the court concluded that
permanent injury may involve not only impairment of the ability to
earn money, but also "impairment of ability to act as one would
like and mental pain in contemplation of it. ' '84 The court further
concluded that justice would not be done if the measure of recovery
for permanent injuries was limited to loss of earnings.
8 5
In Rice v. City of Council Bluffs 86 the Supreme Court of Iowa
sustained an award in a personal injury action to an elderly
woman.87 The court rejected the contention that an instruction,
which advised the jury to consider the plaintiff's past and future
"pain and inconvenience of body and anguish of mind" resulting
from the injury, was improper.88 The court stated: "The pain and
suffering for which the law allows compensation is not confined to
mere physical aches. It includes as well the mental anguish, the
sense of loss and burden, the inconvenience and embarrassment
which the person who is materially crippled or disabled ... can
never escape. '89
80. 191 F. 647 (C.C. E.D. Ky. 1911).
81. Power v. City of Augusta, 191 F. 647, 655-56 (C.C. E.D. Ky. 1911). The plaintiff was
awarded $400 for medical expenses and $2100 for pain and suffering and for the defective limb. Id.
82. Id. at 656.
83. Id. at 648.
84. Id. at 650.
85. Id. at 655. Although it seems it would have been archaic even in 1911 to suggest that a
person would not be entitled to compensation for permanent injury which did cause a loss of
earnings, separate and apart from pain and suffering, that was the state of the law in Kentucky at
that time. See id. at 648-49.
86. 125 1owa 639, 100 N.W. 506 (1904).
87. Rice v. City of Council Bluffs, 124 Iowa 639, -, 100 N.W. 506, 507-08 (1904). The
plaintiff was 71 years old and was driving her horse and carriage through the City of Council Bluffs
when the carriage fell into a three foot cut in the street causing the plaintiff permanent injuries. Id. at
- , 100 N.W. at 506-07.
88. Id. at -_, 100 N.W. at 507.
89. Id. The defendants in Rice had argued that it was erroneous to instruct the jury to consider
the element of future pain and suffering because there was no evidence tending to show that pain and
suffering were likely to result from the plaintiff's injuries. Id. The court of appeal, however, found
sufficient evidence in the record to support the instruction given. Id.
19871
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A comparable rationale was applied in District of Columbia v.
Woodbury.9" In Woodbury the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that the trial court had not erred in allowing testimony
regarding the plaintiff's prior contributions to journals and his
inability to continue his contributions even though he had received
no compensation for them. 91 The Court reasoned that such
evidence tended to show the serious and permanent nature of his
injuries, the extent of his medical and physical suffering, and the
impairment of his capacity to follow normal pursuits. 92 These cases
made it clear that courts were going to recognize that there is some
element of damages that a plaintiff can recover beyond the physical
pain and suffering or the economic losses resulting from injuries. 93
90. 136 U.S. 450 (1890).
91. District ofColumbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450, 459 (1890).
92. Id. The defendants in Woodbury argued that evidence of the plaintiff's contributions to
journals should have been rejected because there was no evidence that he received any income from
them. Id. The Court rejected this contention and stated:
This is not a sound view of the question. Even if those contributions were made
without compensation, his inability to continue them by reason of the injuries in
question was a proper element in the inquiry as to damages. That fact tended to show
the extent of both his mental and physical suffering, resulting from the injuries
received. All evidence, tending to show the character of his ordinary pursuits, and the
extent to which the injury complained of prevented him from following those pursuits,
was pertinent to the issue.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court then noted that when physical suffering results from injuries, it is
necessarily accompanied by some degree of mental suffering, and concluded that the jury is entitled
to consider such mental suffering in arriving at an award of damages. Id. at 459- 60.
93. Although there was some reluctance to recognize that there was some element of damage
beyond the physical pain and suffering or economic losses resulting from injuries in cases in which
the plaintiff was a woman, this too was ultimately accomplished. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 75 W.yo.
390, -, 296 P.2d 252, 262 (1956). In Fox the defendant contended on appeal that because the
injured plaintiff was not employed and merely performed services for her husband in the household
and on the farm, the loss of which would constitute damage only to her husband, the court erred in
instructing the jury to consider her "loss of power and capacity of work and mobility, if any, and its
effects on her future." Id. at__ , 296 P.2d at 261. The court rejected this argument and concluded
that the woman had the right to recover for loss or impairment of power and capacity to work and
mobility, which the court equated with "the right to be a normal human being." Id. at __ , 296
P.2d at 262. The court held that such damages are separate and distinct from damages for loss of
.earnings. Id.
Much of the court's discussion in Fox focused upon what rights could be granted to a woman
plaintiff. See id. at - , 296 P.2d at 259. Noting that "Wyoming has led the way in what may be
called the emancipation of womankind," the court stated:
If, then, we are called upon to admeasure the effect of conflicting decisions from
otherjurisdictions upon this question, it seems but natural that we align ourselves with
those courts which discard common-law inhibitions and, wherever our statutes admit
of such construction, give unto women equal rights with men, including full rights to
recover for whatever legal wrong they suffer, even though their spouses may also suffer
injury through the wrong done unto them.
Id. at __, 296 P.2d at 259-60. While the court in Fox might have thought itself to be on the
forefront, other jurisdictions had for many years recognized the right of women to recover for
permanent injuries, regardless of whether they were employed outside the home. E.g., Power v. City
of Augusta, 191 F.2d 647, 650 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911) (woman with broken kneecap); Warth v.
.Jackson County Court, 71 W.Va. 184, -, 76 S.E. 420, 423 (1912) (woman with broken arm).
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Although courts in these early cases did not use the phrase
"loss of enjoyment of life," these cases are generally included
among the cases cited for the proposition that loss of enjoyment of
life can be a separate element of damages. 94  However, it is
important to remember that, in these cases, courts were merely
recognizing what might more accurately be described as permanent
injury or disability. Obviously, there are many situations in which
the plaintiff sustains permanent injuries that will not result in
economic losses or future pain and suffering, but regardless of this,
the plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury and will be forced to
live with its consequences and limitations for the rest of his or her
life. In jurisdictions in which damages had been permitted only for
economic losses and pain and suffering, recognizing some
additional element of damages was clearly necessary to provide
adequate compensation for an injured plaintiff.
A review of case law indicates that the vast majority of cases in
which courts have recognized that a separate award of damages for
loss of enjoyment of life can be given under some circumstances are
cases in which there was no separate award for permanent injury or
disability.95 It appears that in such cases loss of enjoyment of life is
typically equated with permanent injury or disability or the effects
thereof.9 6 Such cases generally indicate that the damages the
plaintiff can recover for include pain and suffering, mental
anguish, economic losses such as loss of earnings and medical
expenses, and loss of enjoyment of life, described in one way or
94. See Annotation, supra note 76, at 514-15 (citing Power, Rice, and Woodbury for the proposition
that loss or impairment of the capacity to enjoy life, resulting from personal injuries, is a proper
element of damages, separate and distinct from pain and suffering, at least in some instances).
95. See, e.g., Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 7 (Wyo. 1980) (trial court awarded damages for
past medical expenses, lost wages, damages to personal property, past and future pain and suffering,
and loss of enjoyment of life).
96. See, e.g., id.
97. See DeWesse v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 170, 179 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd, 576 F.2d 802
(10th Cir. 1978) (awarding damages for past and future loss of earnings, specials, pain and suffering,
and loss of life's enjoyment); Pierce v. New York Cent. R.R., 409 F.2d 1392, 1395-96 (6th Cir.
1969) (applying Michigan law and approving an award for loss of future earnings, pain and
suffering, and loss of participation in sports and other enjoyments of life); Lebrecht v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 402 F.2d 585, 590-92 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that the jury was properly instructed to
consider past and future loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and the effects "on what might have
been expected to be a normal life," because the jury is entitled to consider the effect of the plaintiff's
injuries on the "normal pursuits and pleasures of life"); Culley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 244 F. Supp.
710, 714-15 (D. Del. 1965) (applying Maryland law and indicating that the elements of damages
were past and future medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and loss of enjoyment of
the visual and familiar things of life); Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 753 (W.D. Mich.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969)
(awarding damages for past and future pain and suffering, medical expenses, impairment of
earning capacity, loss of physical power, vitality, and enjoyment of life); Baker v.
Manhattan Ry., 118 N.Y. 533, -, 23 N.E. 885, 886 (N.Y. 1890) (damages to which the plaintiff
was entitled included her physical pain and mental suffering, and such general inability to attend to
any business as a music teacher); McDougald v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, -, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383,
384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (awarding damages for loss of earnings, future custodial care, future
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another. 97  Simply stated, these cases merely stand for the
proposition that there is some element of compensable damages
beyond physical pain and suffering and economic losses which may
exist in personal injury actions. 98
nursing care, loss of enjoyment of life, and conscious pain and suffering); Reed v. Jamieson Inv. Co.,
168 Wash. 111, -, 10 P.2d 977,978-79 (1932), adheredto on reh'g, 168 Wash. 119, 15 P.2d 1119
(jury was entitled to consider whether the plaintiff's injuries were permanent and how "they are
calculated to disable the plaintiff, if at all, from enjoying the natural and ordinary uses of a healthy
mind and body," in addition to his medical expenses); Warth v. Jackson County Court, 71 W. Va.
184, -, 76 S.E. 420, 423 (1912) (determining that a married woman having no separate business
or estate, employing her time wholly for the benefit of her husband, can recover damages only for
physical pain, mental anguish, and impairment of her capacity to enjoy life); Benson v. Superior
Mfg. Co., 147 Wis. 20, -, 132 N.W. 633, 637 (1911) (approving an instruction allowing
consideration of past and future medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of wages, and the
"deprivation of the pleasures of life"); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 11-12 (Wyo. 1980)
(approving an award of damages for lost wages, medical expenses, damage to personal property, past
and future pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment to plaintiff's life).
98. See McDermott v. Severe, 202 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1906) (holding that the trial court did not
err in instructing the jury to consider the plaintiff's past and future mental suffering and
inconvenience resulting from the injury because injuries could cause more or less continuous mental
suffering in addition to any physical pain); Pierce, 409 F.2d at 1398-99 (indicating that pursuant to
Michigan law loss of life's enjoyment could be a proper element of damages separate and apart fromh
pain and suffering); Reed, 168 Wash. at __ , 10 P.2d at 978-79 (noting that pain and suffering
resulting from injuries is not limited to physical aches, but includes mental anguish, inconvenience,
and the embarassment of being crippled); cf. Rice v. City of Council Bluffs, 124 Iowa 639, -, 100
N.W. 506, 507 (1904) (noting that the pain and suffering for which the law allows compensation is
not confined to mere physical aches, but includes "the mental anguish, the sense of loss and burden,
the inconvenience, and embarassment which the person who is materially crippled or disabled in
body or limb can never escape").
An annotation on loss of enjoyment of life at 15 A.L.R.3d 506, states: "A number of the courts
which have been presented with the issue directly have held that loss or impairment of the capacity to
enjoy life... is a proper element of damages, separate and distinct from pain and suffering, at least
under some circumstances." Annotation, supra note 74, at 514. This annotation contains a list of
cases which had approved of an award for or instruction on loss of enjoyment of life in addition to
damages for pain and suffering. Id. The annotation did not consider whether damages for loss of
enjoyment of life could be awarded in addition to those for permanent injury or disability, and this
issue was not raised in the cases cited. See id.; see, e.g., Power v. City of Augusta, 191 F.2d 647 (C.C.
E.D. Ky. 1911). However, at least one court relied upon the annotation in deciding that no
duplication of damages occurred in a case in which thejury was instructed to award damages for pain
and suffering, permanent injury or disability, and loss of enjoyment of life. See Swiler v. Baker's
Super Market, Inc., 203 Neb. 183, -, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1979). The court in Swiler
overstated the proposition for which the annotation and the cases discussed therein can fairly stand.
See id.; Annotation, supra note 74, at 514. For a discussion of Swiler, see infra notes 119-131 and
accompanying text.
The annotation at 15 A.L.R.3d 506 was superseded by that at 34 A.L.R.4th 293. The new
annotation states: "The courts in the following cases held or recognized that loss of enjoyment of life,
or a loss characterized by some closely synonymous phrase, is a proper element of damages for
personal injuries, separate and distinct from pain and suffering or other categories of damages. "
Annotation, supra note 17, at 304 (emphasis added). Despite the broad nature of this statement, only
two of the cases cited for that proposition, Swiler and Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp., were cases in which it appears the trier of fact considered loss of enjoyment of life in addition
to pain and suffering and permanent injury. See Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621
F.2d 814, 823 (6th Cir. 1980); Swiler, 203 Neb. 183 at -. , 277 N.W.2d at 700. As in the previous
annotation, in most of the cases cited, there was no separate award for or instruction on permanent
injury or disability. See, e.g., Pierce, 409 F.2d at 1397. The failure to recognize that loss of enjoyment
of life developed as a means of compensating permanent injury or disability and that it has been
equated with physical injury or disability by many courts is significant, particularly given the broad
statement of the rule. Under the circumstances, courts should take care not to be misled by the
broadly stated rule and should carefully analyze the cases cited in support of the rules to determine
whether they are applicable in a particular case.
Also included in the list of cases cited in the more recent annotation are those in which the sole
issue was the excessiveness of the verdict, and in which the issue whether the jury may be instructed
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Mariner v. Marsden99 is an example of one of the more modern
cases which has recognized that loss of enjoyment of life can be an
element of damages.100 In Mariner the plaintiff brought an action to
recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 10 1 The
trial court, sitting without a jury, awarded the plaintiff $3000 for
past medical expenses, past lost wages and damages to personal
property, $19,500 for past pain and suffering, $5000 for future pain
and suffering, and $25,000 for loss of enjoyment of plaintiff's
life. 10 2 The court made no award for permanent injury or
disability. 103 On appeal, the defendants argued that the award for
loss of enjoyment of life resulted in a duplication of the damages
awarded for pain and suffering. 104  The court rejected this
argument, holding that "loss of enjoyment of life is a compensable
damage" and stating that the fact finder "may either make a
separate award for loss of enjoyment of life or take into
consideration the loss of enjoyment of life in arriving at the total
general damage. 1105
to award separate damages for loss of enjoyment was not raised. See, e.g., Anunti v. Payette, 268
N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. 1978); see also Annotation, supra note 17, at 307. The previous annotation
indicated that such cases did not necessarily support the conclusion that thejury could be instructed
to award separate damages for loss of enjoyment of life. See supra notes 74, 76. Because cases such
as A nunti do not address the question of whether loss of enjoyment of life can be treated as a separate
element of damage, it is improper to cite these cases as authority for such a proposition. Id.
99. 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980).
100. Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980).
101. Id. at 7. The plaintiff's injuries included cuts on his head, chipped and loosened teeth,
bruises, and severe neck pain. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 7.
103. See id.
104. Id. at8.
105. Id. at 12. Although Mariner involved a trial without ajury, the courts statement that the fact
finder may make a separate award for or take into considerati6n the loss of enjoyment of life certainly
appears to be intended to apply injury cases. See id. This apparently caused Justice Rooney to add a
cautionary comment by way of a special concurrence, which provided as follows:
Although there is a split of authority on whether or not "loss of enjoyment" can
be a separate element of damages, I agree that it can be. However, there is obvious
danger that an award will include double damages when "pain and suffering" or
"disability" (I use the term only as it applies to inability to earn a livelihood) or both
are also present in a case in which "loss of enjoyment" may be an element of damages.
In such case, "loss of enjoyment" may be incident only to one of the other two
elements and, therefore, be not properly subject to separate treatment. But it can also
exist beyond the "pain and suffering" or "disability" and thus be entitled to separate
treatment.
In a jury trial, the court should carefully instruct the jury as to the definitions of
the separate elements of damages and to their application to the facts of the case so as
to avoid an award of double damages.
In this case, tried to the court, the court is presumed to know the law, including
the distinction between such elements of damages. It can be presumed to have
properly applied such law in awarding damages without duplication, whether labeled
"pain and suffering" or "loss of enjoyment."
Id. at 17 (Rooney, J., concurring).
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In reaching its decision in Mariner, the court relied upon its
prior decision in Fox v. Fox, 106 in which the court had held that a loss
of mobility may be compensable even if it does not produce a loss of
earnings. 107 The court in Mariner stated: "This suggests that
appellee's neck injury, which has caused him to curtail some of his
physical activities, should be compensable because it has deprived
him of ordinary human pleasures.' 108 Thus, it appears that the
court in Mariner equated loss of enjoyment of life with what has also
been characterized in many jurisdictions as physical disability or
permanent injury. 10 9 Viewed in this light, the court's decision
represents nothing more than a continuation of the sound historic
trend to recognize that there are damages that may result from
injuries aside from the pain and suffering which the plaintiff might
experience or the economic losses the plaintiff might incur. 110
Although most courts that have recognized loss of enjoyment
of life as an element of damages have not specifically equated loss of
enjoyment with permanent disability, one recent exception is
Flannery v. United States. I,, In Flannery the Supreme Court of West
Virginia responded to certified questions submitted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 112 One of the
questions presented was whether under West Virginia law a
plaintiff in a personal injury action who had been rendered
permanently semicomatose and was unable to sense his loss was
entitled to recover for the impairment of his capacity to enjoy
life. 113 The trial court in Flannery had awarded damages for
hospital, medical, and nursing expenses incurred prior to trial,
106. 75 Wyo. 390, -, 296 P.2d 252, 262 (1956). For a discussion of Fox, see supra note 93.
107. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, -, 296 P.2d 252, 262 (1956). The court in Mariner stated that
it could find no Wyoming cases which had dealt explicitly with an award of damages for loss of
enjoyment of life. Mariner, 610 P.2d at 12.
108. Mariner, 610 P.2d at 12.
109. See id. In Mariner, Justice Rooney, in his special concurrence, notes the possibility of
duplication of damages if loss of enjoyment of life is awarded in addition to pain and suffering and
disability, which Justice Rooney characterizes solely as the "inability to earn a livelihood." Id. at 17
(Rooney, J., concurring). Thus, it appears that the courts in Wyoming take a more limited view of
what constitutes disability or permanent injury than that in many otherjurisdictions. See id.; see, e.g.,
N.D.J.I.-Cv. 1220 (1986) (damages for permanent injury are for loss resulting from disability in
health, mind, or person).
110. See Mariner, 610 P.2d at 12. The court in Mariner also relied upon the statement in Swiler v.
Baker's Super Market, Inc., that a majority of courts have approved inclusion of loss of enjoyment of
life as a consideration upon which an instruction may be given in a proper case. Mariner, 610 P.2d at
12 (citing Swiler v. Baker's-Super Market, Inc., 203 Neb. 183, -, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1979)).
The court in Mariner noted that the decision in Swilerwas "particularly helpful." Mariner, 610 P.2d at
12. The court, however, failed to recognize that the court in Swiler had to some extent overstated the
"majority" position. See infra notes 119-131 and accompanying text.
111. 297 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1982).
112. Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 434 (W.Va. 1982).
113. Id. The plaintiff had been in a semicomatose condition since the accident and his condition
was not expected to improve. Id. The trial court had noted that it was speculative whether the
plaintiffcould, in fact, experience any suffering or pleasure, but stated that he had been deprived of
his capacity to enjoy life. Id. at 435 n.2.
582 [VOL. 63:561
1987] ENJOYMENT OF LIFE 583
future nursing expenses, impairment of earning capacity, and loss
of ability to enjoy life, but had not awarded any amounts for pain
and suffering or for permanent disability. 1,4 The Supreme Court of
West Virginia discussed the element of loss of enjoyment of life and
the cases related thereto and then concluded that loss of enjoyment
of life was a part of and encompassed within the plaintiff's
permanent injury., 15 The court held that "a plaintiff in a personal
injury action who had been rendered permanently semicomatose is
entitled to recover for the impairment of his capacity to enjoy life as
a measure of the permanency of his injuries even though he may not be
able to sense his loss of enjoyment of life.' 116 The court's discussion
in Flannery demonstrates that an award for loss of enjoyment of life
would not have been considered proper if an award had also been
114. Id. at 435.. The plaintiff was awarded $48,174.80 for past hospital, medical, and nursing
expenses, $316,984.00 for future nursing expenses, $535,855.00 for lost wages and impairment of
earning capacity, and $1,300,000.00 for loss of ability to enjoy life, making a total award of
$2,201,013.80. Id.
115. Id. at 436. The court concluded:
We believe that the loss of enjoyment of life is encompassed within and is an
element of the permanency of the plaintiffs injury. To state the matter in a slightly
different manner, the degree of a permanent injury is measured by ascertaining how
the injury has deprived the plaintiff of his customary activities as a whole person. The
loss of customary activities constitutes the loss of enjoyment of life.
Id. The court noted that the loss of the capacity to enjoy life is not a function of pain and suffering in
the traditional sense, but that "our definition of a permanent injury which includes 'those future
effects ofan injury which have reduced the capability ofan individual to function as a whole man,' ..
is the appropriate area for considering the element of the loss of enjoyment of life." Id. at 437
(quoting.Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 634 (W.Va. 1974)).
Similarly, in McDougald v. Garber, the court essentially equated loss of enjoyment of life with
permanent injury. See McDougald v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, -, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 386 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986). In McDougald, the issue presented was whether loss of enjoyment of life was
compensable "even if the injured plaintiff is so severely impaired as to be rendered incapable of
appreciating the loss." Id. at __ , 504 N.Y.S.2d at 385. In deciding that the plaintiffwas entitled to
compensation for loss of enjoyment of life, the court stated:
Proof of the loss of enjoyment of life relates not to what is perceived by the injured
plaintiff but to the objective total or partial limitations on an individual's activities
imposed by an injury. . . . The loss is to be assessed objectively, that is, by the
difference between the injured plaintiff's current capacity and those [sic] which
existed before the injury.
Id. at __ , 504 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
116. Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 439 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that because loss of
enjoyment of life is a measure of permanent disability, the plaintiff's subjective knowledge of the
extent of his loss should not be controlling. Id. at 438.
The issue of whether the plaintiff must be aware of an alleged loss of enjoyment of life in order to
be able to recover for that loss is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it appears that the
resolution of this issue should rest, in part, upon how loss of enjoyment of life is defined. In Flannery,
in which the court equated loss of enjoyment of life with permanent injury, recovery for this element
was permitted even though the plaintiff was in a semicomatose state and apparently was not aware of
his loss. Id. at 438; accord McDougald, 132 Misc. at __ , 504 N.Y.S.2d at 387. The result in Flannery
and McDougald makes sense, since the permanent injury or disability exists regardless of whether the
plaintiff is conscious of the injury or disability. To hold otherwise would mean that a comatose
plaintiff who had no pain or suffering could only recover economic losses. As the court noted in
McDougald:
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made for the permanency of the plaintiff's injuries. 117 The court
specifically noted: "If this had been done, there would have been
an impermissible duplication of damages."
118
Swiler v. Baker's Super Market1 9 is often cited as the leading case
that has recognized loss of enjoyment of life as an element of
damages. Swiler was one of the first cases in which a jury was
specifically instructed to take into consideration the plaintiff's
alleged loss of enjoyment of life.1 20 In Swiler one of the issues on
appeal was whether an instruction which permitted the jury to
consider loss of enjoyment of life in determining damages was
erroneous in that it permitted a duplication of damages. 1 2' The jury
was apparently instructed that the elements of damages included
pain and suffering, permanent disability, and loss of enjoyment of
life.1 22 The court rejected the argument that a duplication had
occurred under the facts presented, stating that a majority of courts
have approved inclusion of loss of enjoyment of life as a
consideration that may be instructed upon in a proper case and be
considered by the jury in determining the amount of damages
suffered by the plaintiff. 2 As authority for this statement, the
court cited to cases in an annotation and three additional cases.
1 24
Defendants maintain that no damages for the loss of the pleasures and pursuits of life
are recoverable unless that loss is consciously perceived. Accepting that argument
would lead to the conclusion that a severely brain damaged plaintiff rendered totally
incapable of experiencing any conscious pain or appreciating his or her condition
would be entitled to no general damages. The subjective perception standard urged by
defendants would result in the paradoxical situation that the greater the degree of
brain injury inflicted by a negligent defendant, the smaller the award the plaintiff can
recover in general damages.
McDougald, 132 Misc. at __ , 504 N.Y.S.2d at 385-86. Although comatose plaintiffs may be entitled
to damages for loss of enjoyment when loss of enjoyment is considered part of damages for a
permanent disability, to the extent that loss of enjoyment is considered an element of pain and
suffering or mental anguish or a separate element distinct from permanent injury or disability, loss of
enjoyment of life should only be compensable to the extent that the plaintiff is conscious of her
inability to enjoy life. See Corcoran v. McNeal, 161 A.2d 367, 372-73 (Pa. 1960), quoted with approval
in Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 393 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978). The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Willinger, in denying compensation for loss of life's amenities to a
person who died as a result of injuries sustained in a car accident, stated that "to a large extent it has
been plaintiff's consciousness of his or her inability to enjoy life that we have compensated under the
rubic of'loss oflife's pleasures,"' Willinger, 393 A.2d at 1191.
117. See Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 438.
118. Id.
119. 203 Neb. 183, 277 N.W.2d 697 (1979).
120. See Swiler v. Baker's Super Market, 203 Neb. 183, -_, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1979). The
Jury was instructed to 'take into consideration' the 'loss of enjoyment of life experienced and
reasonably certain' to be experienced in the future." Id. at __, 277 N.W.2d at 700.
121. Id. at __, 277 N.W.2d at 700.
122. See id. at -, 277 N.W.2d at 700. Although the opinion does not list the elements of
damages on which the jury was instructed other than loss of enjoyment of life, it indicates that the
defendant argued loss of enjoyment of life would represent a duplication of the elements of
permanent disability and pain and suffering. See id. at -, 277 N.W.2d at 700.
123. Id. at__, 277 N.W.2d at 700.
124. Id. at , 277 N.W.2d at 700; see Annotation, supra note 74, at 514. Pierce v. New York
Cent. R.R., 409 F.2d 1392, 1398 (6th Cir. 1969); Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo.
App. 396, -, 522 P.2d 596, 601 (1974); Powell v. Hegney, 239 So.2d 599, 600 (Fla. App. 1970).
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A careful analysis of the cases cited, however, indicates that the
court overstated the proposition for which these cases can fairly
stand.
The cases in the annotation cited in Swiler generally show a
wide split of authority on the issues related to loss of enjoyment of
life. The proposition advanced in the annotation at the specific
page cited by the court in Swiler was merely that loss of enjoyment
of life resulting from personal injuries "is a proper element of
damages, separate and distinct from pain and suffering. ' 125
Neither this proposition nor the three additional cases cited by the
court in Swiler directly support the court's conclusion that a
duplication of damages did not result.' 26 The cases cited did not
involve situations in which a jury had been instructed to award
damages for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and
permanent injury or disability. 127 Moreover, the court in Swiler
125. Annotation, supra note 74, at 514.
126. See Pierce, 409 F.2d at 1399; Hildyard, 33 Colo. App. at __, 522 P.2d at 601; Powell, 239
So.2d at 601. The court in Powell noted that the standard jury instruction in Florida includes
consideration of"any resulting pain and suffering, disability, mental anguish and loss ofcapacity for
the enjoyment of life." Powell, 239 So. 2d at 600 (emphasis omitted). The court held that the trial
court erred when it only instructed that the plaintiff could recover for any bodily injury and any
resulting pain and suffering. Id. The issue of a possible duplication of damages was not raised. Pierce
involved a trial before the court sitting without a jury and there was no award made specifically for
permanent injury. Pierce, 409 F.2d at 1394. In Hildyard, apparently no argument was made that a
duplication of damages resulted from the loss of enjoyment of life instruction and the court's opinion
does not indicate on what other elements of damage the jury was instructed. See Hildyard, 33 Colo.
App. at __, 522 P.2d at 601-02. The court merely noted that the instruction was not erroneous
because evidence of such a loss had been introduced at trial. Id. at __ , 522 P.2d at 601-02 (citing
Rodriguez v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 32 Colo. App. 378 __, 512 P.2d 652, 655 (1973)).
In Rodriguez the defendant had argued that the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to testify that
as a result of his injury he could no longer enjoy playing softball or riding his motorcycle because the
plaintiff failed to plead this as special damages. Rodiguez v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 32
Colo. App. 378, -, 512 P.2d 652, 653 (1973). The court rejected this argument, noting that the
plaintiff had requested damages for present and future pain and suffering as well as permanent
disability, and that the trial court allowed the testimony, "not for the purpose of establishing a
separate element of damages for loss of enjoyment, but for the purpose of establishing the degree and
extent of the pain and suffering." Id. at -, 512 P.2d at 654. The court concluded that the
plaintiff's inability to play softball or ride his motorcycle was not treated as a separate element of
damages and that this was demonstrated by the instruction to thejury, which provided:
In assessing actual damages, you shall consider the nature and extent of the injuries,
the physical and mental pain and suffering endured prior to the trial of this case and
loss of wages or income, insofar as each of such items has been established by the
evidence. If you find that, as a result of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff will
necessarily endure and incur in the future, physical and mental pain and suffering,
loss of full enjoyment of life, permanent injuries or disability, or loss of earnings or
impairment of earning capacity, then you shall take these matters into consideration in
assessing damages insofar as such items have been established by the evidence.
Id. (quoting the trial court's instruction to the jury).
127. The significance of the court's failure in Swiler and similar cases to recognize and discuss
the relationship between permanent injury and loss of enjoyment of life was noted in Flannery v.
UlnitedStates, in which the court stated:
The cases that recognize the loss of enjoyment of life do not analyze its
relationship to the permanency of the plaintiff's injury in any detail. Yet, it is obvious
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made no effort to analyze the relationship between the plaintiff's
permanent injury or disability and his alleged loss of enjoyment of
life or to distinguish the two. 128 Given the fact that the vast majority
of cases which have approved loss of enjoyment of life as an element
of damages have apparently done so as a way of measuring
permanent disability or injury, 129 the court's opinion in Swiler is
seriously flawed.
The court in Swiler merely applied what it perceived to be the
"majority rule" without considering the historical background of
loss of enjoyment of life as an element of damages, the
distinguishing factors in the various cases which have dealt with
issues relating to loss of enjoyment of life, and the underlying
rationale for the decisions in cases that have recognized loss of
enjoyment of life as an element of damages under some
circumstances. Under the circumstances, courts should not accept
or apply the "majority" rule as articulated in Swiler. This is
particularly true given the fact that although the court in Swiler
indicated that when the evidence supports it loss of enjoyment of
life may be argued to the jury, 30 the court went on to state that a
separate instruction on loss of enjoyment of life might be redundant
and that it did not recommend that such an instruction be given. '
3'
Of the cases that have approved loss of enjoyment of life as an
element of damages, only one case, Thompson v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp., 132 appears to have directly confronted the issue of a
possible duplication of damages when there is an award made for
pain and suffering, permanent injury or disability, and loss of
that the loss of enjoyment of life is directly linked to the permanency of the plaintiff's
injury and a jury in evaluating the nature and degree of the permanency of the
plaintiff's injury will ascertain how such injury has affected his ability to perform and
enjoy the ordinary functions of life.
Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 437 (W.Va. 1982). For a discussion of Flannery, see supra
notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
128. See Swiler v. Baker's Super Market, 203 Neb. 183, -_, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1979).
129. See, e.g., Power v. City of Augusta, 191 F. 647, 655 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911) (jury allowed to
take into consideration the effect of the permanent injury, including the impairment of the ability to
move about as one would like).
130. Swiler, 203 Neb. at__, 277 N.W.2d at 700.
131. Id. at-, 277 N.W.2d at 700. The court in Swilerdid not articulate the reasons why it did
not recommend that an instruction on loss of enjoyment of life be given, except to say that it "may be
redundant." Id. at __ , 277 N.W.2d at 700. Apparently, the court had some misgivings about the
ability of the jury to distinguish between loss of enjoyment of life and disability. Other courts appear
to have had the same concern. See Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824-
25 (6th Cir. 1980) (decision to uphold an award for loss of enjoyment of life was based in part upon
the trial judge's ability to distinguish loss of enjoyment of life from pain and suffering and to award
appropriate compensation for each). One commentator has read these cases as demonstrating "an
unvocalized fear that a jury would be incapable of rationally distinguishing these concepts and
awarding appropriate damages." Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life As a Separate Element of Damages,
12 PAC. L.J. 965, 982 (1981).
132. 621 F.2d814(6thCir. 1980).
enjoyment of life. '33 This also appears to be the only case in which
the court has attempted to define the differences between these
elements. 134
In Thompson the court rejected the contention that an award
made by the trial court, sitting without a jury, for the impairment
of enjoyment of life was duplicative of the awards made for pain
and suffering and permanent injury.1 35 The court stated that pain
and suffering, permanent injuries, and impairment of enjoyment of
life were conceptually distinct categories of intangible damages.
136
The court explained that damages for permanent injuries provides
compensation for being permanently impaired, whether or not the
injury caused any pain or inconvenience. 1 37 Damages for pain and
suffering, however, compensates the victim for physical and mental
discomfort caused by the injury, while damages for loss of
enjoyment of life provide compensation for limitations on the
injured person's life created by the injury. 138
The line which the court attempts to draw between permanent
impairment and loss of enjoyment of life is blurred at best. While a
court sitting without a jury might arguably be able to make such a
distinction, it is questionable whether a jury could draw such a fine
distinction.
In summary, loss of enjoyment of life appears to have
developed as a means of allowing full compensation for a plaintiff's
injuries, and particularly, as a means of permitting compensation
for permanent injury and disability. However, courts and
commentators have not always recognized the historical
development of loss of enjoyment of life as a consideration in
awarding damages or the varying circumstances that have existed
in cases which have decided issues relating to loss of enjoyment of
life. Thus, there is a danger that such cases might be read as
standing for more than what they actually do stand for. Suffice it to
say that the cases which have approved loss of enjoyment of life as
an element of damages have involved a number of different issues
and the courts have applied a wide variety of approaches in
resolving these issues. Thus, courts and counsel should take great
care that such cases are not read as standing for more than what
was actually determined in a particular case and that such cases
actually apply to the case in controversy. 139
133. See Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 1980).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 823-24.
136. Id. at 824.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781, 786 (N.D. 1985) (stating that the authority of a
decision is limited to the points actually considered and determined).
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III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR NORTH DAKOTA
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has yet to specifically
consider whether "loss of enjoyment of life" is a factor which the
jury can properly consider in determining the amount of damages
in a personal injury action or whether loss of enjoyment of life
should be recognized as a separate element of damages. Given the
wide variety of approaches employed by courts from other
jurisdictions and the conflicting results in such cases, courts which
are called upon to resolve these issues should carefully consider not
only the holdings in cases which have decided similar issues, but
also the underlying reasons for the court's decision and the
circumstances presented in a particular case. Most importantly,
courts should resist the temptation to blindly follow what some
courts have inappropriately described as the "majority" rule.
14 0
There are some significant distinctions between jurisdictions that
have considered these issues which might be overlooked if this is
done.
A good starting place for analysis of the issues that might arise
relating to loss of enjoyment of life is the standard North Dakota
jury instruction on the elements of damages in a personal injury
action. 1 41  Pursuant to North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions-Civil 1220 the jury is instructed that in determining
the amount of its verdict for damages arising from personal injury,
it may consider each of the following items of claimed detriment
proximately resulting from the injury in question: (1) medical
expense; (2) loss of productive time; (3) pain, discomfort, and
mental anguish; and (4) permanent disability or injury.1 42 With
respect to the first three elements of damages, the jury is instructed
to make an award for both past and future damages. 1 4 3 The portion
of the instruction on permanent disability instructs the jury to
consider the following:
Reasonable compensation for permanent injuries or
lasting impairment of health, that is, for the loss resulting
140. See, e.g., Swiler, 203 Neb. 183, __, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (majority of courts have
approved inclusion of loss of enjoyment of life as a consideration in determining damages). For a
discussion of Swiler, see supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
141. N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986). For the text of North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions -
Civil 1220, see supra note 8. As previously noted, North Dakota has enacted a statute that is
consistent with the provisions of North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil 1220. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04 (Supp. 1987). For the text of S 32-03.2-04 of the North Dakota Century
CODE, see supra note 8.




from complete or partial disability in health, mind, or
person. In determining whether there are permanent
injuries or lasting impairment of health, you should
consider the nature of the injuries or impairment of
health, whether the ailment can be cured or relieved by
proper medical treatment or care, and whether the
ailment will subside or become worse. The measure of
damages for permanent injuries or lasting impairment of
health is compensation for the disabling effect of the
injury, past or prospective. The destruction or
impairment of any physical function is a proper element
of damages. 1
44
North Dakota Jury Instructions- Civil 1220 suggests that a
jury is entitled to consider what other courts have at times described
as loss of enjoyment of life, under the elements of pain, discomfort,
and mental anguish and permanent disability. 145 To the extent loss
of enjoyment of life is said to be the anxiety and distress which
result from the inability to be able to participate in prior activities
or from contemplation of this, 146 the jury is free to award damages
under the element of "pain, discomfort and mental anguish."
Clearly, under North Dakota law, the jury is not limited to a
consideration of the plaintiff's physical pain and suffering. 1 7 To
the extent loss of enjoyment of life consists of the physical
limitations caused by the plaintiff's injuries, 14 8 the jury is free to
award damages under the element of "permanent disability."
Pursuant to North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 1220,
the jury is free to award compensation for permanent disability and
the effects thereof regardless of whether it has resulted in or will




146. See, e.g., McDermott v. Severe, 202 U.S. 600, 611 (1906) (jury may consider six-year old's
future mental suffering found to be the direct and necessary consequence of the loss of his leg); Reed
v. Jamieson Inv. Co., 168 Wash. 111, - , 10 P.2d 977, 978-79 (1932) (jury may consider in
damage award the sense of loss and mental anguish which the disabled person can never escape).
147. See N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986). The North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions clearly
provide that the jury can consiller mental anguish in awarding damages. See id. For the text of North
Dakota PatternJury Instructions - Civil 1220, see supra note 8. Other courts have taken the position
that the phrase "pain and suffering" includes mental anguish. See, e.g., Huffv. Tracy, 57 Cal. App.
3d 939, 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (1976) (pain and suffering element in damages award describes
not only physical pain but also grief, anxiety, and apprehension).
148. See, e.g., Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1982) (underlying
function of loss of enjoyment of life element is to measure the degree of permanent disability to the
whole person from the injuries inflicted).
149. See N.D.J.I. - Civ. 1220 (1986). For the text of North Dakota Pattern.Jury Instructions -
Civil 1220, see supra note 8. Courts early on recognized loss of enjoyment of life as a means of
compensating noneconomic losses arising out of permanent injuries. See, e.g., Power v. City of
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Although the Supreme Court of North Dakota has never
specifically stated that loss of enjoyment of life is a factor which the
jury can consider in awarding damages, it appears that the court
would allow consideration of what some courts have described as
loss of enjoyment of life. In at least two cases in which the issue on
appeal was whether the jury's verdict was excessive, the court, in
upholding the verdict, has discussed what other courts have
referred to as loss of enjoyment of life. 
150
In Anderson v. Schreiner 151 the jury had returned a verdict in the
amount of $20,000 for a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile
collision. 152 The defendant appealed and argued that the damages
were excessive. 153 The plaintiff, who was a student at the time of
the accident, had not incurred any wage loss and had incurred
special damages of approximately $3000.154 In rejecting the
defendant's argument that the damages were excessive, the court
noted the plaintiff had been in pain and that his education might
have been delayed, but the court relied primarily upon the
plaintiff's permanent disability in affirming the judgment. 55 The
court stated the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff was totally
disabled for nine months and that he had a permanent disability of
his leg and knee which might worsen in the future. 156 The court
further stated that "as a result of his disability, plaintiff ... will be
handicapped from engaging in all but the most moderate of
physical activity. 157
Augusta, 191 F. 647, 655 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1911) (in awarding damages jury should be allowed to
consider the effect of the injury other than on the power to earn or make money).
150. See Holte v. Carl Albers, Inc., 370 N-W.2d 520, 527 (N.D. 1985) (plaintiff can no longer
participate in work around home, and her social and family life is consequently restricted); Anderson
v. Schreiner, 94 N.W.2d 294, 301-02 (N.D. 1958) (plaintiff, as a result of his injury, will be
handicapped in engaging in all but the most moderate of physical activity).
151. 94 N.W.2d 294(N.D. 1958).
152. Anderson v. Schreiner, 94 N.W.2d 294, 300 (N.D. 1958). In Anderson the plaintiff suffered
a comminuted fracture of the thigh bone of his right leg and also suffered fractures of the third and
fourth metatarsals of the left foot as a result of the accident. Id.
153. Id. at 300-01.
154. Id. at 301. The $3000 in special damages included damages for hospital expenses, for loss of
the automobile, and for other incidental expenses. Id.
155. See id. at 301-02. After reviewing the plaintiff's injuries, the court concluded that although
the damages awarded were large in amount, "[tlhey are not however so large that we can say that
the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the amount did not evidence passion and
prejudice on the part of thejury." Id. at 302.
156. Id. at 301.
157. Id. at 301-02. The court summarized the plaintiffs injuries as follows:
Under the evidence in this case the jury could have found that the plaintiff was
totally disabled from October 1954 toJune 1955; that during that time he underwent
four operations; that during all of that time he endured varying degrees of pain; that
thereafter his disability diminished but that he has a permanent disability of 15% in
his right leg and of 5% in his left foot; that he has a permanent limitation of normal
action in his right knee and hip; that he has a shortening of two inches in his right leg;
that the muscles in his right leg are atrophied to the extent that his left thigh is two
590 [VOL. 63:561
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More recently, in Holte v. Carl Albers, Inc., 158 the Supreme
Court of North Dakota also upheld a jury verdict against a
challenge that it was excessive. 159 Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the court noted the long-term or
permanent disability sustained by the plaintiff and the pain
resulting from her injuries. 160 The evidence indicated the plaintiff
experienced pain, tired easily, and experienced discomfort when
she engaged in activities requiring significant movement. 161 The
court stated that the jury could have determined the accident.
aggravated the plaintiff's preexisting arthritic condition "to such
an extent that she can no longer participate as she was accustomed
to doing in the farm work, house work, and yard work, and that her
social and family life is also now consequently restricted." 162 Thus,
the court concluded that the evidence presented at the trial was
sufficient to sustain the jury's award of damages. 
1 63
The North Dakota Supreme Court's opinions in Anderson and
Holte implicitly, if not directly, support the conclusion that, what
has at times been described in other jurisdictions as loss of
enjoyment of life, can be considered by a jury applying North Dakota
law in making an award of damages. 164 This conclusion is
consistent with the plain language in North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions-Civil 1220 and clearly represents the better rule. 165
The only cases which have totally rejected loss of enjoyment of life
as a consideration in awarding damages have held it to be too vague
or speculative to form a basis for damages.166 However, awarding
damages for the physical limitations resulting from a plaintiff's
inches greater in circumference than the right thigh; that his permanent disability will
not diminish but will possibly increase and that as a result of his disability, plaintiff,
who has a life expectancy of 44 years, will be handicapped in engaging in all but the
most moderate of physical activity. The jury could also have found that plaintiff was
delayed for at least six months in obtaining his engineer's degree and thus delayed for
six months in securing employment as an engineer.
Id. at 301-02.
158. 370 N.W.2d 520 (N.D. 1985).
159. Holte v. Carl Albers, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 520, 527 (N.D. 1985). The defendant argued that
the verdict was attributable to improper remarks by counsel and that the jury was swayed by passion
and prejudice and disregarded the evidence. Id. Furthermore, the defendent contended that the
medical testimony indicated that the plaintiff's injuries 'were not permanent and that she had
recovered from them. Id.
160. Id. As a result of an automobile accident, the plaintiff sustained partial disability or
reduction in the motion of her cervical spine, and she experienced severe headaches and pain in the




164. See id.; Anderson v. Schreiner, 94 N.W.2d 294, 301-02 (N.D. 1958).
165. See N.DJ.I. - Civ. 1220 (1986). For the text of North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions-
Civil 1220, see supra note 8.
166. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
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injuries and the mental distress resulting therefrom is no more
difficult than determining the amount of damages for pain and
suffering resulting from such injuries. 167 Neither is capable of
measurement with mathematical precision, but that has never been
a requirement for an award of general damages under North
Dakota law. 168 . Under the circumstances, courts should allow
counsel to present evidence of loss of enjoyment of life to the jury
and the jury should be entitled to consider such evidence in arriving
at an award of damages in a personal injury action.
The more difficult question is whether loss of enjoyment of life
should be included as a separate element of damages under North
Dakota law. This would allow a jury instruction on or a separate
award for loss of enjoyment of life. A review of cases from other
jurisdictions in light of the underlying bases for the decisions and in
light of the standard North Dakota jury instructions demonstrates
that North Dakota courts should hold that loss of enjoyment of life
is not a separate element of damages, but a component of the other
established elements of damages under North Dakota law.
The vast majority of the cases that have upheld an instruction
on or award for loss of enjoyment of life are easily distinguishable in
the context of North Dakota law, because these cases use loss of
enjoyment of life as a means of compensating permanent disability.
For example, the court in Mariner v. Marsden 69 upheld an award for
loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages against a
claim that it would result in a duplication of damages, but there was
no award made for the plaintiffs physical disability. 70 In addition
to the award for loss of enjoyment of life, damages were awarded
only for pain and suffering, medical expenses, property loss or
damage, and loss of wages.171 In finding loss of enjoyment of life to
be compensable, the court relied upon the fact that the plaintiff's
injury would cause him to curtail his physical activities.
1 72
Numerous courts have applied similar rationales to support the
conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for more
than just physical pain and suffering and economic loss as a result
167. See Power v. City of Augusta, 191 F. 647, 650 (C.C. E.D. Ky. 1911) (stating that it is no
more difficult to determine how much compensation should be allowed for disfigurement than to
determine how much should be allowed for pain and suffering).
168. See, e.g., Anderson, 94 N.W.2d at 301 (stating that in personal injury cases there is no
method by which damages may be computed with mathematical precision and thus wide discretion
must be allowed to the jury).
169. 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980).
170. See Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 7 (Wyo. 1980).
171. Id. at 7 n.1.




of permanent injuries, including compensation for the physical
limitations and mental anguish resulting therefrom, although these
courts have not always awarded such compensation under the
specific heading of loss of enjoyment of life. 
17
In view of the circumstances, the result in cases such as Mariner
is not inappropriate. If a plaintiff loses a finger as a result of the
tortious conduct of another, even if it does not result in a loss of
earning capacity and may not cause future medical bills, the
plaintiff has sustained a permanent injury and ought to be
compensated for his loss. This is true even if this permanent injury
will cause him no future physical pain or suffering. Compensating
the plaintiff for past economic damages and physical pain resulting
from his injury will obviously not result in full compensation, since
if damages are awarded only for those elements, the plaintiff would
receive nothing for the loss of his finger or the physical limitations
and mental anguish resulting therefrom.
Cases such as Mariner do not support the proposition that loss
of enjoyment of life should be recognized as a separate element of
damages under North Dakota law. It is not necessary under North
Dakota law to create a new element of damages in order to fully
compensate a plaintiff for his injuries. Full compensation can be
awarded under the current standard jury instruction. Pursuant to
North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 1220, the jury is
instructed to award reasonable compensation for economic losses,
for pain, discomfort, and mental anguish, and for "permanent in-
juries or lasting impairment of health, that is, for the loss resulting
from complete or partial disability in health, mind, or person." 174
The jury is instructed that "[t]he measure of damages for perman-
ent injuries or lasting impairment of health is compensation for the
disabling effect of the injury, past or prospective" and that "[t]he
destruction or impairment of any physical function is a proper
element of damages. ' ' 175 Clearly a jury in North Dakota is
instructed to award damages as a result of any impairment of
physical function, and plaintiffs are compensated for their
permanent injuries regardless of whether there are financial
consequences or physical pain. 176 Thus, juries in North Dakota are
173. See, e.g., Sauers v. Alaska Barge & Transp. Inc., 600 F.2d 238, 243 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979)
(loss of enjoyment of life's normal activities); Robert v. Chodoff, 393 A.2d 853, 873 (Pa. Super.
1978) (no prospect for improvement or enjoyment of life); Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d
433, 437-38 (W. Va. 1982) (reduced capability to function as a whole man).
174. N.D.J.I. - Cy. 1220 (1986). For the text of North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions-
Civil 1220, see supra note 8.
175.Id.
176. See Holte v. Carl Albers, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 520, 527 (N.D. 1985); Anderson v. Schreiner,
94 N.W.2d 294, 301-02 (N.D. 1958). For a discussion of Holte and Anderson, see supra notes 151-163
and accompanying text.
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already permitted to award damages for what other courts have
characterized as loss of enjoyment of life.
Given the North Dakota jury instruction on the elements of
damages, inclusion of loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element
of damages would create a substantial possibility of duplication of
damages. The case of Blodgett v. Olympic Savings &Loan Association177
is particularly persuasive in this regard because the Washington
Pattern Jury Instructions given in that case are essentially identical
to the provisions in North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions- Civil
1220.178
In Blodgett the defendants appealed an $850,000 award for the
plaintiff, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
to consider loss of enjoyment of life in- awarding damages. 179 The
elements set forth in the instructions to the jury were those set forth
in Washington Pattern Jury Instructions 30.04 through 30.08,
which includes the nature and extent of the injury, past and future
disability and disfigurement, past and future mental and physical
pain and suffering, past and future medical expenses, and past and
future loss of earnings. 180 Moreover, in Blodgett, loss of enjoyment
of life was listed as an additional element for the jury to consider. 181
The Court of Appeals of Washington indicated that adding loss of
enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages could result in a
duplication of damages, and concluded that loss of enjoyment of life
was merely a component of pain and suffering. 182 The court
concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury and
therefore reversed the trial court. 183
A similar result, based upon similar analysis, has been reached
in other jurisdictions which already recognize permanent disability
or injury as a separate element of damages. 184 Other courts have
177. 32 Wash. App. 116, 646 P.2d 139 (1982).
178. CompareW.P.I. 30.01, 30.04-.08 (1980) (amended 1984) with N.D.J.I.- Civ. 1220 (1986).
For the text of North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil 1220, see supra Note 8.
179. Blodgett v. Olympic Say. & Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash. 116, -, 646 P.2d 139, 145 (1982).
For a discussion of Blodgett, see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
180. See id. at __, 646 P.2d at 145. For a discussion of Blodgett, see supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text. See also W.P. I. 30.03-.08 (1980) (amended 1984).
181. Blodgett, 32 Wash. at __ , 646 P.2d at 145. For a discussion of Blodgett, see supra notes 39-
45 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at __, 646 P.2d at 145. For a discussion of Blodgett, see supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
183. Id. at __, 646 P.2d at 145-46. For a discussion of Blodgett, see supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Huffy. Tracy, 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, -, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (1976). For a
discussion of Huff, see supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. Apparently courts in such cases
typically view loss of enjoyment of life as something resulting from anxiety and mental distress
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equated loss of enjoyment of life with permanent injury or disability
or some other component of damages. For example, in Flannery v.
United States, 185 which recognized loss of enjoyment of life could be
an element of damages under certain circumstances, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia specifically stated that if an
award of damages were made for both loss of enjoyment of life and
permanent disability, it would result in a duplication of
damages. 18 6 The court noted that the loss of the capacity to enjoy
life is not a function of pain and suffering in the traditional sense,
but that "our definition of a permanent injury which includes
'those future effects of an injury which have reduced the capability
of an individual to function as a whole man,'... is the appropriate
area for considering the element of the loss of enjoyment of life." 187
Although the definition of permanent injury employed by the court
in Flannery contains different language than that used in North
Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil 1220, it is to the same
effect. 188
In resolving the issues relating to loss of enjoyment of life in
the context of North Dakota law, it is important to carefully analyze
the few cases which have recognized loss of enjoyment of life as an
element of damages in addition to pain, mental distress, and
permanent disability or injury, rejecting the contention that an
impermissible duplication of damages can result.189  Careful
analysis of such cases demonstrates that they provide little or no
support for the proposition that courts in North Dakota should
recognize loss of enjoyment of life as an element of damages.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Swiler v.
Baker's Super Market, 190 which is perceived as one of the leading cases
in the area of loss of enjoyment of life, is not persuasive given the
court's failure to analyze the cases upon which it relied for the
''majority" rule it purported to apply. 191 These cases did not
caused by physical limitations and injuries, as opposed to the physical limitations themselves. See,
e.g., Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at -, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553. For a discussion of cases which indicate
that adding loss of enjoyment of life as an element of damages would result in duplication of
damages, see supra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
185. 297 S.E. 2d 433 (W. Va. 1982).
186. Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E. 2d 433, 438 (W. Va. 1982). For a discussion of
Flannery, see supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
187. Id. For a discussion o1 Flannery, see supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
188. Compare N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986) (loss resulting from complete or partial disability in
health, mind, or person) with Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 438 (those effects of an injury which reduce the
capability of an individual to function as a whole man).
189. See Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 825 (6th Cir. 1980);
Swiler v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 227 N.W. 2d 697, 700 (Neb. 1979). For a discussion of
Thompson, see supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Swiler, see supra notes
119-31 and accompanying text.
190. 277 N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 1979).
191. See Swiler, 277 N.W.2d at 700. For a discussion of Swiler, see supra notes 119-31 and
accompanying text.
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support the court's conclusion in Swiler that no duplication resulted
when the jury was instructed to consider pain and mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and permanent injury or disability, since
the vast majority of these cases involved no jury instruction on or
award for permanent injury or disability. 192  As discussed
previously, the cases cited in Swiler merely recognized that a
plaintiff is entitled to more than damages for pain and suffering,
but the court in Swiler failed to consider that the cases relied upon
did not contain awards for permanent injury or disability.
193
Moreover, the court in Swiler made no attempt to define the various
elements of damages or to distinguish them. 194 Under the
circumstances, it would be inappropriate in the context of North
Dakota law to rely on the opinion in Swiler to support the
contention that loss of enjoyment of life should be recognized as an
element of damages. This is also true because the opinion in Swiler
was limited to the facts presented and because the court in Swiler
specifically stated that it did not recommend that an instruction on
loss of enjoyment of life be given. 1
95
In Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 196 the United
States C3urt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument
that an award made for loss of enjoyment of life in addition to that
for pain and suffering and permanent impairment resulted in a
duplication of damages. 97 The case was tried by the district court
without a jury. 98 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit defined the various elements of damages. 99
The court explained that damages for permanent impairment were
compensation for the plaintiff's permanent injuries, whether or not
the injury caused any pain or inconvenience. 00 Damages for pain
192. See id. For a discussion of Swiler, see supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
193. See id. For a discussion of Swiler, see supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
194. See id. For a discussion of Swiler, see supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
195. Id. For a discussion of Swier, see supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
196. 621 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1980).
197. Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d at 824-25 (6th Cir. 1980). The
district court in Thompson had awarded damages for five elements: 1) expenses; 2) pain, suffering,
and fright; 3) permanent injuries; 4) impairment of earning capacity; and 5) impairment of
enjoyment oflife. Id. at 823. Referring to the elements of permanent injuries and loss of enjoyment of
life, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated:
The District Judge obviously thought these were distinct categories for he did not
award the same amount for permanent injuries as he did for impairment to enjoyment
of life. If the District Court had included impairment of enjoyment of life as an
element of permanent injury, the awards in the permanent injury category would
probably have been higher.
Id. at 824-25. For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
198. Id. at 816. For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
199. Id. at 824. For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
200. Id. For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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and suffering were to compensate the injured party for the physical
and mental pain caused by the injury, while damages for loss of
enjoyment of life were to compensate the victim for the limitations
on the person's life created by the injury.2 10 The distinction which
the court attempted to draw between permanent impairment and
loss of enjoyment of life is blurred at best. While a court such as
that in Thompson sitting without a jury might arguably be able to
distinguish between loss of enjoyment of life and permanent
impairment, it is questionable whether a jury can draw such a fine
distinction. Although the court in Thompson suggests permanent
impairment is limited only to the fact of being permanently
injured, 20 2 the plain meaning of the word "impairment" suggests
otherwise. "Impairment" is ordinarily defined as "the act of
impairing or the state of being impaired: Injury... : Deterioration
• . . Lessening .... ",203 "Impair" is commonly defined as "to
make worse: diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength:
do harm to: Damage, lessen.''204 Given the common meaning of
these words, permanent impairment could easily be understood by
a jury as including the limitations resulting from the injury, which
the court in Thompson indicated could be compensated under the
separate element of loss of enjoyment of life. 205 Certainly, without
specific instructions defining the scope of permanent impairment as
an element of damages there would be a great potential for
confusion. Under the circumstances, the result in Thompson should
only be applied in situations in which the court sits without a jury.
Even assuming there might be a valid distinction between loss
of enjoyment of life and permanent impairment as defined by the
court in Thompson and that the distinction might be within the grasp
of an ordinary jury, the opinion in Thompson does not support the
conclusion that loss of enjoyment of life should be recognized as a
separate element of damages under North Dakota law. The
definition of permanent disability under the standard North
Dakota jury instruction is much broader than the definition ofr
permanent impairment set forth in Thompson. 20 6 The -explanation of
201. Id. For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
202. See id. For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
203. WEBSTER'S THI RD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (1981) (capitalization omitted).
204. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (5th ed. 1979) (defining impair as "to make
worse, to lessen in power, or relax or otherwise affect in an injurious manner").
205. See Thompson, 621 F.2d at 824.
206. Compare N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986) (defining permanent disability as loss resulting from
complete or partial disability in health, mind, or person) with Thompson, 621 F.2d at 824 (defining
permanent impairment as compensation for being permanently impaired whether or not the injury
caused pain or inconvenience).
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permanent disability in North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions-Civil 1220 is such that the jury is free to consider not
only the fact of the injury, but also all past or future disabling
effects of the injury. 20 7 Thus, permanent disability, as defined
pursuant to North Dakota law, includes what the court in Thompson
designated a loss of enjoyment of life.
20 8
North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions- Civil 1220 is
extremely broad in defining what constitutes permanant injury or
disability. 20 9  Pursuant to North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions-Civil 1220, to the extent that a plaintiff is unable to
engage in the activities in which she formerly engaged or has other
limitations as a result of her injuries, she will be compensated under
the element of permanent disability.2 10 To the extent that such
limitations cause the plaintiff mental distress, she will be
compensated under the element of mental anguish. 211 Thus, the
standard North Dakota jury instruction on the elements of damages
in a personal injury action already permits full and adequate
compensation for the plaintiff's injuries, including what some
courts have described as loss of enjoyment of life. 212 Under the
circumstances, to instruct on loss of enjoyment of life as an element
of damages or to allow the jury to make an award for loss of
enjoyment of life would be to instruct on the same elements of
damages twice and it would create a substantial possibility of
duplication.
Although a plaintiff is entitled to have her case submitted to
the jury with appropriate instructions, it is a well-established rule
that a court errs if it instructs the jury twice on the same element of
damages. 213 The underlying reason for this is obviously to prevent
the possibility of duplication of damages. 214 Given the standard
207. See N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986). For the text of North Dakota Pattern J-ury
Instructions-Civil 1220, see supra note 8.
208. Compare N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986) (defining permanent disability as loss resulting from
complete or partial disability in health, mind, or person) with Thompson, 621 F.2d at 824 (defining
loss of enjoyment of life as limitations on the person's life caused by the injury).
209. See N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986). For the text of North Dakota Pattern Jury




213. See DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 434 (Iowa 1974) (instruction in personal injury
action allowing the jury to award damages for both lost earnings and loss of support as a parent or
spouse, without related instruction precluding allowance for both to the extent that lost earnings
would be the source of any loss of support, erroneously enabled the jury to award duplicate
damages); Singles v. Union Pac. R.R., 173 Neb. 91, -_, 112 N.W.2d 752, 755 (1962) (instruction
in personal injury case that the plaintiff should be compensated for impairment of future earning
capacity and also for future loss of time was erroneous in that it permitted double recovery for future
loss of time).
214. DeWall, 224 N.W.2d at 434; Singles, 173 Neb. at -, 112 N.W.2d at 755.
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North Dakota jury instruction on the elements of damages, and
particularly the broad definition of permanent disability therein, if
a court were to give a separate instruction on loss of enjoyment of
life as an element of damages, it would constitute instructing the
jury twice on the same element of damages. Under the
circumstances, North Dakota courts should avoid the temptation to
blindly follow what other courts have inappropriately described as
the "majority" rule and should hold that loss of enjoyment of life is
not a separate element of damages under North Dakota law. Thus,
trial judges should present North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions-Civil 1220 to the jury without modification.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although some courts have held that evidence of loss of
enjoyment of life cannot be introduced or considered by a jury in
awarding damages on the grounds that loss of enjoyment of life
would be vague and speculative, 215 such damages are no more
speculative than other types of general damages which juries are
free to consider. A jury should be free to consider all the effects of a
plaintiff's injury in order to assure that full compensation is
awarded. Given the North Dakota Supreme Court's opinions in
Anderson216 and Holte2t 7 and the plain language of North Dakota
Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 1220,218 it appears that North
Dakota adheres to this position and will allow juries to consider loss
of enjoyment of life.
North Dakota courts should not, however, recognize loss of
enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages or permit an
instruction on it. Although loss of enjoyment of life has been a
somewhat elusive and seldom defined concept, it has generally
developed over the years as a means of compensating an injured
plaintiff for either physical disability or the mental anguish
resulting therefrom. In jurisdictions which formerly limited a
plaintiff's recovery to economic losses and physical pain and
suffering, recognition of loss of enjoyment of life was perhaps an
appropriate means of allowing the jury to award the plaintiff
adequate compensation. However, this could also have been
215. See supra note 17 and cases cited therein.
216. 94 N.W.2d 294 (N.D. 1958). For a discussion of Anderson, see supra notes 151-57 and
accompanying text.
217. 370 N.W.2d 520 (N.D. 1985). For a discussion of Holte, see supra notes 158-63 and
accompanying text.
218. See N.D.J.I.-Civ. 1220 (1986). For the text of North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions-Civil 1220, see supra note 8.
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accomplished by recognizing permanent injury or disability as an
element of damages, as many jurisdictions have done. It is not
necessary in North Dakota to create a new element of damages to
allow a jury to fully compensate the plaintiff. North Dakota law
does not limit damages to economic losses and physical pain and
suffering as a result of the injuries. The North Dakota jury
instructions have recognized mental anguish and permanent
disability as elements of damages for many years, and the broad
definition of permanent disability in the instructions allows the jury
to consider all the effects of a plaintiff's injuries. The current North
Dakota instructions relating to the elements of damages recoverable
in an action for personal injuries allows a jury to fully compensate a
plaintiff. There would be a substantial possibility of duplication, if
a court were to also instruct on loss of enjoyment of life or to allow
the jury to make a separate award for it. Accordingly, to avoid the
possibility of duplication of damages, North Dakota courts should
hold that loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of
damages and should give North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions
-Civil 1220 without modification.
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